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This thesis explores the work of two German Jewish émigré scholars, Karl Loewenstein 
and John H. Herz, and how they confronted the conflict between fascism and democracy 
throughout the 1930s and during World War II. Loewenstein, in academic publications and later 
through a campaign of public advocacy, urged the adoption of his theory of militant democracy 
for the protection of democratic institutions. Originally conceived as temporary legislation to 
deprive fascists of the fundamental rights they abused in order to seize power, this theory 
evolved into the understanding by Loewenstein that fascist and democratic states could not 
coexist, and that fundamental changes must be implemented within the legislative and executive 
branches of democratic governments to create a more responsive, flexible system. Defined by his 
 v 
 
pessimistic worldview, Loewenstein was acutely anxious about fascism, especially after the start 
of World War II. In contrast to Loewenstein, and despite his own pessimism, Herz conceived of 
an international system that combined both realism and idealism in order to obviate man’s 
violent and suspicious anthropology and create a peaceful international order in which nations, 
regardless of their particular political ideology, could coexist.  
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“Now the chasms of the 20th century were revealed: 
the abyss of racism that was to end in holocaust; total war, 
already foreshadowed in the blood-filled trenches of  
World War I… All of this destroyed [the] remnants of still 
existing rationalistic belief in “inevitable progress.” 
The world became a theater of the absurd, and I became 
more and more pessimistic.” 
 
- John H. Herz 
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Introduction: 
 
Karl Loewenstein, John Herz and the Flight from Fascism 
 
 
 
 
 In April 1933, shortly after his appointment as Chancellor, Adolf Hitler passed the “Law 
to Restore the Professional Civil Service,”1 which, with few exceptions, removed non-Aryans 
from government positions, targeting Jews in particular.2 For the thousands of German Jewish 
intellectuals working in government service and teaching at German universities, this law was 
cataclysmic, removing them from positions they had occupied for decades, and severing them 
from the life that they labored to build.3 Statistically, in 1933, following passage of the law, more 
than 16 percent of university faculty lost their jobs, and over the next six years, especially after 
passage of further restrictions, this number rose to greater than one-fourth of all university 
teachers.4 Social scientists and political scientists were especially hard hit, with some universities 
                                                
1  Gesetz zur Wiederherstellung des Berufsbeamtentums  
 
2  Claus-Dieter Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile: Refugee Scholars and the New School for Social Research 
(Cambridge: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), 12. 
 
3  For further information on the émigrés and their experiences, see Peter M. Rutkoff and William B. Scott, 
New School: A History of the New School for Social Research (New York: Free Press, 1986); Donald P. Kent, The 
Refugee Intellectual: The Americanization of the Immigrants 1933-1951 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1953); Maurice B. Davie, Refugees in America: Report of the Committee for the Study of Recent Immigration from 
Europe (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947); H. Stuart Hughes, The Sea Change: The Migration of Social 
Thought, 1930-1945 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); Anthony Heilbut, Exiled in Paradise: German Refugee 
Artists and Intellectuals in America From the 1930s to the Present (Boston: University of California Press, 1983). 
Herz discusses his immigration experience at length in his biography, which is reviewed in Chapter Three.  
 
4  Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 12. 
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losing over 50% of their staff, resulting in “the eliminat[ion] of an entire [new] research tradition 
critical of the historicism and idealism long dominant in German thinking.”5 
 For many of these dismissed university professors, leaving Germany was the best option, 
and aided by newly formed international rescue committees, over 50% of those who lost their 
jobs in 1933 – 650 total – immigrated from Germany.6 By the end of the 1930s this number had 
risen to over 1,700, and, including doctors, lawyers, artists and writers, to over 12,000.7 While 
initially most of these émigrés chose to remain in Europe to stay closer to Germany, faced with 
Hitler’s march across Europe, as well as the difficulty of “shedding one’s status as an alien in 
Europe,” ever growing numbers of intellectuals chose to leave Europe for America, until by the 
start of World War II by far the largest proportion of German émigrés had found residence in the 
United States.8 In America, these intellectuals saw President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and 
especially his New Deal, as the heir to their progressive work during the failed Weimar 
Republic, and appreciated the ease with which they, as immigrants in a country full of 
immigrants, could blend into society at large, making “the process of reintegration exceedingly 
simple.”9  
Despite this openness, the path of the German Jewish immigrant was fraught with 
difficulties. These scholars were forced to compete for scarce permanent teaching positions at 
                                                
5  Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 13.  
 
6  Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 11, 15. 
 
7  Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 11. 
 
8  Franz L. Neumann, The Cultural Migration: The European Scholar in America (New York: A. S. Barnes, 
1961). 
 
9  Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 17; Neumann, Cultural Migration, 18-19. See also Neumann’s entire 
description of his time in America. He writes: “[a]s impressive, if not more so, was the character of the American 
people, its essential friendliness, the neighborly, almost comradely spirit. Many have analyzed their traits and sung 
their praises, and I need not repeat all this.” Neumann, Cultural Migration, 18. There is no similar sentiment found 
in either Herz or Loewenstein’s papers.  
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xenophobic and anti-Semitic American universities that regarded them with suspicion.10 It was 
only after American universities realized the positive benefit German faculty members had on 
the academic quality of departments that a larger number of teaching positions became available, 
and American institutions became more willing to hire Germans.11 Even after securing teaching 
positions, these intellectuals still had to cope with the psychological consequences of their 
sudden dismissals and forced immigrations, and watch as Hitler and Nazi Germany successfully 
conquered much of Europe, spreading fascism across the European continent throughout the 
1930s and 1940s. 
Such experiences profoundly altered the worldview of some of these émigrés, causing 
them to both reassess their academic work, as well as look at the world through new, pessimistic 
eyes.12 This thesis tells the story of two of Jewish German émigré intellectuals, Karl Loewenstein 
(1891–1973) and John H. Herz (1908-2005), and how they responded, through their work, to 
their immigrant experience and the dilemma to democracy presented by fascism’s widespread 
success. While both are ancillary figures in the greater history of the émigrés, their work – and 
especially Loewenstein’s – showcase how scholars attempted to understand the new world they 
found themselves a part of, as well as to protect the nation that had become their home and 
represented the last bastion of democracy and free thought.  
After his immigration to the United States in 1933, Loewenstein began to research the 
ways in which democracies could defend themselves from fascism. Faced with the apparent 
prospect of an endless, creeping tide of fascism, spreading across the globe and consuming 
democratic nations from within, he argued for the adoption of militant democracy, or the idea 
                                                
10  Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 22-24. 
 
11  Krohn, Intellectuals in Exile, 24. 
 
12  Neumann, Cultural Migration, 18. 
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that democracies must proactively defend themselves against internal fascist threats. According 
to Loewenstein, fascists were able to abuse the fundamental rights granted to them by democratic 
constitutions – namely freedom of speech, press and assembly, and equal participation in the 
electoral process – to destroy democracy from within. The key to defending democracy and 
defeating fascists was to deny them these fundamental rights through temporary restrictive 
legislation. Loewenstein presented this idea in four academic articles published in 1935 and 
1937.  
Confronted with the success of Hitler and Germany throughout the 1930s, Loewenstein 
continued to develop his theory of militant democracy, and by 1938 had come to believe that 
beyond temporary legislation, it was necessary for democracies to transform their legislative and 
executive branches into smaller, more responsive bodies better able to cope with emergent 
situations and the speed of the modern state. Key to understanding this evolution is 
Loewenstein’s growing pessimism towards the future prospects of democracy, rooted in his 
forced immigration from Germany, as well as his mounting anxiety about fascism. In 1935 and 
1937 he still approached the conflict between democracy and fascism as an objective academic, 
but by 1938 he became increasingly personally involved with the defense of democracy, arguing 
urgently for the quick adoption of militant democracy in the United States in order to protect 
America from the dire fascist threat.  
This personal involvement manifested itself in an extensive campaign of public advocacy 
for the passage of restrictive legislation in the United States. While he never revealed his entire 
theory (especially his belief in the necessity to transform the American system), from 1938 until 
1947 Loewenstein attempted, through book reviews, speeches and a pamphlet, to convince the 
public of the necessity of restricting the right of fascists, as well as of the threat posed to  
America by a hidden Fifth Column of fascist and fascist sympathizers poised to aid Hitler in 
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destroying the United States. This campaign took on a particular urgency in the aftermath of the 
surprising and rapid defeat of France in 1940. Following this defeat, Loewenstein attempted to 
do whatever he could to convince the general public of the urgent need to use militant democracy 
in America, including presenting himself as a defender of traditional Anglo-Saxon Christian 
American society, despite his nationality and ethnic heritage. 
Following the attack on Pearl Harbor and the American entrance into the war, 
Loewenstein, like many other German émigrés, joined the American government, eventually 
assisting in denazification by interviewing Nazis as part of the Nuremburg prosecution. Even 
after the final defeat of Hitler, Loewenstein’s advocacy for militant democracy continued, and he 
remained pessimistic and anxious about fascism. He was publicly critical of denazification, 
believing that the German citizenry were unrepentant, and that the American failure to 
effectively root out and punish Nazis had set the stage for the reemergence of fascist Germany 
and the continuation of the threat to the United States and democracy. During this period, 
Loewenstein’s understanding of militant democracy continued to evolve as well, until, by 1944, 
he had come to believe that it was impossible for democracies and fascist states to coexist. 
Unfortunately, Loewenstein’s pessimism, his particular views on fascism, his public 
campaign of advocacy for militant democracy and even the evolutions of this theory throughout 
the 1930s and early 1940s are entirely missing from the historiography. Over the past two 
decades, as scholars have confronted issues of domestic terrorism, human rights reforms and 
sovereignty in the wake of the Cold War, they have returned to the idea of militant democracy as 
a starting point for their research. As part of this research, Loewenstein has a newfound 
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relevance among political scientists, especially when examining democratic responses to national 
threats.13  
Little research has been done into Loewenstein for Loewenstein’s own sake. Virtually 
every scholar writing about him does so in the context of another event, and their work gives the 
impression that Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy simply appeared in 1937, fully 
formed, and remained static over the next decade. The best examination of Loewenstein’s life 
and work to date is Markus Lang’s biography of Loewenstein, Karl Loewenstein: 
Transatlantischer Denker der Politik, published in 2007 and based on Lang’s earlier dissertation.  
However, even Lang’s biography is deficient, devoting only fifteen pages to Loewenstein’s work 
on militant democracy, with no mention, beyond a single footnote, of Loewenstein’s campaign 
of public advocacy for adoption of militant democracy in the United States.14 Instead, Lang opts 
to focus on Loewenstein’s role in the development of political science as a field, and seeks to 
integrate Loewenstein into the growing category of émigré transatlantic intellectuals who, by 
leaving Germany, offered an implicit critique of the Nazi regime.15 Lang reiterated this approach 
in a chapter on Loewenstein, “Karl Loewenstein: From Public Law to Political Science,” as part 
of German Scholars in Exile: New Studies in Intellectual History, published in 2011.  
                                                
13  Markus Thiel, “Introduction,” in The ‘Militant Democracy’ Principle in Modern Democracies, ed. Markus 
Thiel (New York: Ashgate, 2009), 1-15.  
 
14  Markus Lang, Karl Loewenstien: Transatlantischer Denker der Politik (Stuggart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 
2007), 207-222. The single reference to Loewenstein’s public campaign can be found in a footnote on page 222, 
where Lang references a speech given by Karl Loewenstein and Lawrence B. Packard at Amherst College in 1940. 
For more on this speech see Chapter Two. Unfortunately, Lang does not analyze this speech at all, or even quote 
from it.  
 
15  Devin O. Pendas, “An Atlantic Giant,” review of Karl Loewenstein: Transatlantischer Denker der Politik, 
by Markus Lang, April, 2010, H-Net. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-
diplo&month=1004&week=c&msg=NeuD8zGoQ9C8loBjoMkP%2BA&user=&pw=. For examples of similar 
styles of works, see Uta Gerhardt, Denken in der Demokratie: Die Soziologie im atlantischen Transfer nach 1945 
(Stuttgar: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2007); Matthias Stoffregen, Kampfen fur ein demokratisches Deustchland: 
Emigraten zwischen Politik und Politkwissenshaft (Opladen: Leske und Budrich Verlag, 2002).  
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 The majority of works on Loewenstein and militant democracy, on the other hand, use 
Loewenstein’s theories as part of a commentary on a present day dilemma – for example 
terrorism – and devote little more than a footnote to Loewenstein or his work. There is no hint of 
Loewenstein’s public advocacy for militant democracy, or of any evolution within his theory 
throughout the 1930s and early 1940s. Typical of this category of works is a recent dissertation 
on Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy,” by Svetlana Tyulkina, finished in 2011.16 While 
Tyulkina does an excellent job of tracing the influence of Loewenstein’s work in the modern 
world, as well as highlighting examples of legislation and constitutional amendments today that 
are examples of militant democracy, she spends no time exploring the development of the theory, 
or the greater intellectual context within which Loewenstein worked. Martin Klamt follows a 
similar approach in his chapter, “Militant Democracy and the Democratic Dilemma: Different 
Ways of Protecting Democratic Constitutions,” in Explorations in Legal Culture, published in 
2007.17 
 The only mention of Loewenstein’s public campaign for militant democracy is found not 
in a work within the Loewenstein historiography, but rather in an article about the German Jurist 
Carl Schmitt’s interrogations as part of the Nuremburg Trials. Loewenstein, in his capacity as an 
officer with the U.S. Military Government in Berlin (1945-1947), pressed American officials to 
arrest Schmitt. While describing Loewenstein and Schmitt, Joseph W. Bendersky references a 
letter to the editors of The New York Times written by Loewenstein that was highly critical of 
                                                
16  Sveltana Tyulkina, “Militant Democracy,” (PhD diss., Central European University, 2011). 
 
17  For similar works, see Paul Harvey, “Militant Democracy and the European Convention on Human 
Rights,” European Law Review 3 (2004): 407-420; Leslie Turano, “Spain: Banning Political Parties as a Response 
to Basque Terrorism,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 4 (2003): 730-740, among others. Tyulkina’s 
dissertation includes a longer list of relevant works; see Tyulkina, “Militant Democracy,” 19-20. While these works 
are relevant to modern day discussions of militant democracy, they are not particularly useful when researching 
Loewenstein’s biography or the development of militant democracy.  
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denazification.18 This letter, along with others composed by him on the same subject, were part 
of Loewenstein’s post-war campaign for the application of militant democracy in defeated 
Germany. Beyond this reference, as well as the one found in Lang’s biography, no other 
references to Loewenstein’s public statements exist.  
** 
 
 Like Karl Loewenstein, John H. Herz’s immigration from Germany left him sharply 
pessimistic. After arriving in America in 1938, while studying at Princeton, he began to 
investigate the way in which international relations functioned, and how and why states came 
into conflict with one another. Like Loewenstein, Herz joined the American government during 
the war to help combat Nazism, and after the war was highly critical of denazification. During 
this period, Herz concluded that man was inherently concerned with his personal security, and 
that the knowledge that other men held the potential to kill him led to a state of constant, 
potential violence, regardless of actual intent. Relations between nations were this 
anthropological state, termed the security dilemma, writ large. Despite his pessimistic 
anthropological view, Herz believed that, through a combination of measured realism and 
idealism known as Liberal Realism, a peaceful world system could be achieved. Thus man, 
cognizant of his nature, could overcome his native state and work towards a peaceful future.  
While Herz acknowledged this future was unlikely to come to pass, his theory still held 
the possibility for a world in which nations, independent of their political ideology, by pursuing 
Liberal Realism, could peacefully coexist. Written in the years before World War II and the 
beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s, Herz’s theory was fundamentally concerned with 
describing a world in which nations of competing ideological orientations, in particular 
                                                
18  Joseph W. Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt’s Path to Nuremburg: A Sixty-Year Assesment,” TELOS 139 (2007): 
21. 
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democracy and communism, could avoid destructive war. This potential for peace represents a 
working out of Herz’s pessimism, despite his biography and worldview, and, in contrast with 
Loewenstein, shows how unusual Loewenstein’s particular solution to the conflict between 
fascism and democracy was.   
 Compared to Loewenstein, the Herz historiography is considerably smaller, arising only 
in the past ten years, and focuses on Herz’s role in the development of international relations as a 
field, and his participation in the wider community of such scholars in the post-War world. As 
yet, no scholar has compared Herz to other émigré intellectuals, or explored the relationship 
between his theories and Loewenstein’s militant democracy. Today, the leading academics 
working on Herz are Peter Stirk, Jana Puglierin, Christian Hacke and Ken Booth. Puglierin has 
written the only contemporary monograph on Herz, John H. Herz: Leben und Denken zwischen 
Idealismus und Realismus, Deutschland und Amerika, published in German in 2011 and 
developed from an earlier dissertation. Puglierin also helped edit a 2007 issue of International 
Relations (a publication that Herz contributed to throughout his life) devoted to Herz’s work. In 
this issue she, along with Hacke, contributed two articles on Herz’s life and work, “John H. 
Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality,” and “Toward Being a ‘Traveller Between All Worlds’.” 
Along with Hacke and Puglierin, Ken Booth has written on Herz’s Political Realism and 
Political Idealism in “Navigating the ‘Absolute Novum’: John H. Herz’s Political Realism and 
Political Idealism.” 
 Peter Stirk also contributed to the Herz issue of International Relations. In “John H. Herz 
and the International Law of the Third Reich,” he explores Herz’s conception of Nazi 
international law and his work on this subject. Stirk also mentions Herz in a work on Carl 
Schmitt, Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich: On Preemptive War, Military 
Occupation, and World Empire, presenting Herz’s understanding of international relations as an 
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alternative to Schmitt’s.19 Looking forward, with the recent release of Herz’s papers, catalogued 
at the University at Albany as part of their Jewish immigrants collection, it is likely that more 
works devoted to his life and theories will be forthcoming.20 
**  
 
 The story of Loewenstein and Herz is, fundamentally, a story of their pessimism, and 
how this pessimism manifested itself in both their academic work and public discourse.  
Chapter one provides a detailed analysis of Loewenstein’s academic work on militant 
democracy, beginning in 1935 and ending in 1938. In this work, the evolution of militant 
democracy can be first observed, as well as Loewenstein’s growing concern with fascism and the 
threat posed by fascists to the United States. The second chapter explores Loewenstein’s public 
advocacy for the adoption of antifascist legislation in the United States, beginning in 1938 and 
concluding with his critique of denazification following his departure from government service 
in 1947. Throughout this period, despite the defeat of Hitler by the Allies in 1945, Loewenstein 
remained acutely anxious about fascism, and had little hope for the future of democracy. Chapter 
                                                
19  Peter M. R. Stirk, Carl Schmitt, Crown Jurist of the Third Reich: On Preemptive War, Military Occupation, 
and World Empire (London: Edwin Mellon Press, 2005).  
 
20  Herz and Loewenstein were by no means the only scholars of international conflict working during this 
period. Among many others, Carl Schmitt and Hans J. Morgenthau deserve particular mention. Schmitt, who stayed 
behind in Germany and briefly joined the Nazi regime until he fell afoul of the SS in 1936, described the ‘equal 
chance,’ an important theory to be aware of when reading Loewenstein, in his 1932 work Legality and Legitimacy. 
See Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004): 28-33. For 
secondary literature on Schmitt, see William E. Scheuerman, Carl Schmitt: The End of Law (London: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 1999); Joseph W. Bendersky, Carl Schmitt, Theorist for the Reich (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983); Michael G. Satler, Carl Schmitt: Law as Politics, Ideology and Strategic Myth (New York, Routledge, 2012); 
Benno Gerhard Teschke, “Fatal Attraction: A Critique of Carl Schmitt’s International Political and Legal Theory,” 
International Theory 3 (2011): 179-227.  Morgenthau, another German Jewish émigré, had a similar understanding 
of anthropology and international relations to Herz, but believed that, based on man’s inherently violent nature, a 
peaceful world order free of war was impossible, and that international relations would be inevitably plagued by 
conflict and confrontation. See Hans J. Morgenthau, Scientific Man Versus Power Politics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1946); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1948); Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1951). 
For secondary literature on Morgenthau, see see William E. Scheuermann, Morgenthau (New York: Polity, 2008); 
Michaela Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment 
(New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010); Michael C. Williams, Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans 
Morgenthau in International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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three moves beyond Loewenstein, focusing instead on Herz, and examines the relationship 
between the two scholars, and how Herz, despite his similar biography and worldview, 
developed a markedly different solution to the dilemma facing democracy. Finally, the 
conclusion reflects on the position of militant democracy today, and how Loewenstein and 
Herz’s worldviews evolved in the decades following World War II. While Herz remained 
optimistic, Loewenstein, despite the emergence of a democratic Germany, remained pessimistic 
until the end of his days.  
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Chapter One 
 
The Academic: Karl Loewenstein and the  
Development of Militant Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
“If democracy is convinced that it has not yet fulfilled  
its destination, it must fight on its own plane a technique 
which serves only the purpose of power. Democracy must 
become militant.”21 
 
 
 
 Karl Loewenstein was born in Munich, Germany in 1891 to a family of wealthy Jewish 
Bavarian industrialists, and traveled extensively during his childhood, including time spent living 
in England and South America.22 After several years at universities in Munich, Heidelberg – 
where he studied under Max Weber – Paris and Berlin, he received a law degree in 1914. During 
World War I he spent 1915 serving with the German infantry,23 and was admitted into the 
German bar in 1918.24 A year later Loewenstein received his doctorate in civil and ecclesiastical 
                                                
21  Karl Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I”, The American Political Science 
Review 3 (1937): 419. 
 
22  To this point, no comprehensive biography of Loewenstein has been published in English. While Lang’s 
biography, Transatlantischer Denker der Politik does provide an in-depth overview of Loewenstein’s formative 
years, it has yet to be translated.  
 
23  Unfortunately little information is available about Loewenstein’s war service. 
 
24  R. W. Kostal, “The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Loewenstein and the Legal Reconstruction of Nazi 
Germany, 1945-1946,” Law and History Review 29 (2011): 3-4. 
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law at Munich.25 After practicing law throughout the 1920s in and around Munich, Loewenstein 
entered academia and became a lecturer at the University of Munich School of Law in 1931. He 
was forced to resign this position in 1933 as a consequence of the Nazi’s efforts to purge non-
Aryans from public service, and shortly thereafter left Germany for the United States. While in 
America, with the help of the Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced German Scholars, 
Loewenstein secured a two-year teaching position at Yale University in 1935, and in 1936 
accepted a permanent position teaching political science at Amherst College.  
 
** 
 
During this period, shortly after immigrating to the United States, Karl Loewenstein 
began writing academic articles about the spread of fascism, and, in particular, what steps the 
remaining western democracies should undertake to protect themselves from internal fascists 
threats.26 These articles provide much of the basis for the future importance of Loewenstein’s 
work, and show a clear progression of thought that mirrors European political developments 
throughout the 1930s. In the first of these articles, “Autocracy Versus Democracy in 
Contemporary Europe I and II,” published in The American Political Science Review in 1935, 
Loewenstein examines the political makeup of Europe, as well as the prospect of the remaining 
democratic nations of succumbing to internal fascist movements. Within this analysis, he first 
describes what he later terms militant democracy, the idea that democratic nations must 
proactively defend themselves against fascism, as fascists are all too capable of utilizing 
democratic principles to enable their ascent to power. No longer are these principles alone 
                                                
25  Joseph Bendersky, “Carl Schmitt,’s Path to Nuremburg: A Sixty-Year Assessment,” TELOS 139 (2007): 
10. 
 
26  Markus Lang, “Karl Loewenstein: From Public Law to Political Science,” in German Scholars in Exile: 
New Studies in Intellectual History, ed. Axel Fair-Schulz et al (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), 36.  
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sufficient to protect the state – rather, these principles, and in particular the democratic belief in 
fundamental rights, in many ways enable the fascists to succeed.   
 Loewenstein continued his inquiry into the conflict between democracy and fascism in a 
pair of 1937 articles, “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights I and II,” again published in 
The American Political Science Review. These two articles continue his examination of fascism, 
while investigating the similarities between European fascists movements, and the steps these 
movements undertook to transition from the political fringe to the sole governmental authority 
within a state. Loewenstein also continues to outline possible steps that democratic nations must 
take to resist the spread of fascism, including what antifascist legislation has already been 
enacted by democratic states, and how these laws, which are examples of militant democracy in 
action, work to protect the democratic state. 
 Although much of the content of this article is similar to the earlier “Autocracy Versus 
Democracy I and II,” Loewenstein’s tone throughout is noticeably more alarmist. As he has 
witnessed the progressive spread and success of fascism throughout Europe, his hope for the 
continued existence of democratic states has waned. Further, the steps outlined by Loewenstein 
in “Militant Democracy” are a temporary abandonment of many of the principles and rights held 
most dear to democratic nations – an abandonment, that, in Loewenstein’s eyes, is necessary for 
the defense of democracy in the long term. This abandonment, forced upon democratic nations 
by the unique nature of the fascist threat, is one of the most fascinating elements of 
Loewenstein’s work during this period, and reflects both his pessimism – rooted in his recent in 
his recent immigration – as well as his growing anxiety about fascism.  
 Loewenstein continues this argument in his next pair of articles, “Legislative Control of 
Extremism in European Democracies I and II,” published in Columbia Law Review in 1938. 
Similar to “Militant Democracy,” in these articles Loewenstein surveys existing anti-fascist 
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legislation, and, in technical legal language appropriate for a law journal, analyzes the way in 
which these laws effectively deprive fascist groups of the tools necessary to seize power from the 
existing democratic system. Even when writing in such a legalistic context, Loewenstein cannot 
help but reaffirm the pessimistic way in which he views the prospects of the democratic states, as 
well as reveal his continued anxiety about the threat posed by fascism to the west. Even here he 
presents the conflict between fascism and democracy as a war, arguing that everything possible 
must be done to protect democratic institutions, no matter the cost.  
 Loewenstein published another article in 1938 on militant democracy, “The Balance of 
Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law,” in The 
University of Chicago Law Review. Importantly, in this article, Loewenstein expands on his 
original theory of militant democracy, and argues for the necessity of implementing fundamental 
changes to the political process of the United States in order create a smaller and more 
responsive legislature better able to cope with the demands of a modern state, along with a more 
powerful, active executive. Unlike the temporary antifascist legislation, these proposed changes 
would be permanent, and represent a radicalization of Loewenstein’s thought, as well as the 
evolution of a second level to his theory of militant democracy, encompassing both temporary 
and permanent measures.  
Examining Loewenstein’s articles during this period reveals the growing alarm with 
which Loewenstein describes the spread of fascism, transforming the dry, academic examination 
of fascism as a new political movement in 1935 into the panic of the late 1930s. Loewenstein 
believed that if radical steps were not taken, then the remaining democratic nations, including the 
United States, would fall to internal subversive fascist elements. This mounting anxiety reveals a 
fundamental change in Loewenstein’s outlook. He became, like so many other Jewish 
intellectuals who were forced to flee Germany after the Nazi Party seized power in 1933, a 
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pessimist. He was no longer content to simply hope that democratic principles, human nature and 
inevitable progress were safeguards against the darker forces of humanity embodied by fascism. 
Instead, democratic nations must participate in an active fight against fascism, taking whatever 
steps are necessary in order to prevent their internal destruction at the hands of fascist agitators.  
 
** 
 
 Loewenstein’s first examination of fascism and the prospects of its further spread 
throughout Europe can be found in “Autocracy Versus Democracy in Cotemporary Europe I and 
II,” published in 1935. These articles are the beginning of a new era in Loewenstein’s research 
and writing. The tone that Loewenstein takes throughout these article – that of an objective 
academic investigating a new political development – and the way he describes fascism are 
significant, and stand in contrast to his later works, where his personal involvement in the 
protection of democracy and his anxiety are much clearer. Beyond showing the development of 
his theory of militant democracy, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I and II” show the beginning of 
Loewenstein’s transformation from academic to advocate.  
 Loewenstein’s work here is a reflection of the political climate of Europe in the early to 
mid 1930s. Between 1933, when Loewenstein fled from Germany, and 1935, when he published 
“Autocracy Versus Democracy I and II,” Germany had reemerged as one of the Great Powers on 
the European continent, while the European democracies, suffering through the Great 
Depression, became increasingly unstable. Hitler, by pursuing an aggressive foreign policy that 
took advantage of the worsening relationship between England and France, was able to press 
Germany’s diplomatic position, forcing concessions from England and France on provisions 
from the Treaty of Versailles. Simultaneously, while fascist Germany prospered, the political 
power of France waned. Beset by serious internal strife and economic turmoil, French politics 
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throughout the 1930s was increasingly dominated by the radicalized elements of the far left and 
far right, with the possibility of outright revolution by either group festering just below the 
surface.27  
 The position of the smaller democratic powers in Europe was particularly treacherous. 
Faced with the decline of France and the reemergence of Germany, these small powers – 
including Czechoslovakia, Belgium, Poland and the Baltic States – were forced to contend with 
an evolving international political landscape as well as internal unrest at the hands of the 
unemployed and dissatisfied who looked to Germany and Russia for an example of the proper 
response to the Depression.28 Read within the context of the unstable political landscape, 
Loewenstein’s analysis becomes more meaningful, as well as a clear response to the new reality 
of European politics in 1935. 
 Loewenstein begins by summarizing the “political scene of contemporary Europe,” 
pointing out that the European states, “are aligned in two fundamentally antagonistic camps,” 
democracy and liberalism, and autocracy.29 Loewenstein believes that Great Britain, the Irish 
Free State, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland 
and Czechoslovakia fall into the former category, while Russia, Turkey, Germany, Italy, 
Portugal, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Estonia and Latvia 
compromise the latter.30 According to Loewenstein, in 1935 “by far the greater part of European 
territory and of European population is under dictatorial rule of one type or another,” and, facing 
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this reality, it is necessary to examine the prospects of the remaining democratic nations for 
becoming autocratic dictatorships.31  
 Before undertaking this examination, Loewenstein briefly reviews the political history of 
democratic and autocratic forms of government, taking pains to point out that “the rationalization 
of government by the devices of free self-expression called democracy is a comparatively new 
phenomenon,” and that for the large part of human history man has lived under autocratic 
systems.32 Beyond the accuracy of this assertion, which functions to dispel much of the surprise 
surrounding the spread of dictatorships, as in many ways this spread can be seen as simply 
reverting to the mean, Loewenstein’s comments here do much to reveal the tone he takes 
throughout the article. At this stage Loewenstein is still attempting to approach his subject with 
an element of academic objectivity and distance. It is unclear at this point how he personally 
feels about autocracy, and in particular fascism, and what greater meaning he attaches to the 
prospect of the further spread of autocracy throughout the remaining democratic European 
nations. This attempt at objectivity is further evident in Loewenstein’s acknowledgement of the 
unique nature of this spread of autocratic governments. While “to the observer of history,” the 
reemergence of “Caesarism” is not surprising, the speed by which “the new dictatorial wave” has 
spread is unique, and prompts “deep concern to everybody who values democracy as a higher 
step of mankind toward progress and civilization.”33 By writing as such, Loewenstein is 
couching his analysis. For those who believe that democracy is the next step in mankind’s march 
of progress, fascism is a threat; but this belief is neither universally held nor necessarily correct.  
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Importantly, in this first section, and in line with the title of the article, Loewenstein 
contrasts democracy and autocracy in general, and places both Russia and Germany, despite their 
opposing worldviews, within the autocratic category. Lowenstein acknowledges this relationship 
early on, pointing out that his use of autocracy as a descriptive term “embraces not only the 
fascist variety as presented by Italy and Germany, but also the communistic form of dictatorship 
in Russia.”34 This distinction is significant, as for the majority of his following articles, and, in 
fact, most of “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” he almost exclusively discusses the prospect of 
the continued spread of fascism, ignoring the obvious parallels between Russia and Germany, 
and the crimes of Stalin and Hitler.  
** 
 
 After briefly outlining the historical background of fascism, Loewenstein begins his 
analysis of the odds of the remaining democratic European nations for becoming fascist.35 
Loewenstein first attempts to “distinguish between the general tendencies of the replacement of 
democratic by autocratic rule and the specific conditions arising from the economic and political 
situation of a given country.”36 Loewenstein here is presenting the adoption of fascism as the 
consequence of two diverse factors: those that are general and exist regardless of particular 
circumstance, and those that are the direct result of the Great Depression and economic unrest.  
 In general, much of fascism’s appeal comes from fulfilling what Loewenstein terms “the 
missionary spirit,” or the “individual’s obsession by belief in the absolute and indisputable value 
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of his own devotion to a new basic principle of life,” which causes him to preach this ideology at 
every turn.37 The proponents of this new ideology act as missionaries, spreading the doctrine of 
fascism like a religion. This spread is further facilitated by local concepts of nationalism and 
regionalism, as within these beliefs fascism can be seen as a unifying ideology to help reunite 
populations that have been previously separated. 
 As to the particular, the appeal of fascism reflects the generally held belief that economic 
change requires a change in government. For populaces suffering under the spreading worldwide 
Great Depression, “national economic autarchy has become the catchword of the day,” which 
can only be achieved by an active government that interferes with the economy.38 This, in turn, 
necessitates an organized, centralized authority unfetered by private interests, and logically, the 
concentration of “political power in the hands of a government strong enough to cope with the 
obstacles during the transition period [from unplanned to planned economy].”39 Facing this 
crisis, “dictation from above becomes necessary, even where the spirit of the nation abhors 
compulsory methods of suppression of free institutions.”40 Thus, fascism is seen as the solution 
to economic depression, and the poorer the economic situation in a particular nation, the greater 
the prospects for this nation adopting fascism.  
 Beyond the two different motivations leading to the support of fascism, democracy in 
Europe is further threatened by the “facilities afforded by the fascist technique,” namely the 
encouragement of apathy and silence, which causes citizens who recognize the threat to do 
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nothing.41 This encouragement in many way stems from what Lowenstein describes as the 
“science” of introducing fascism into a democratic state, which is a “typical procedure applicable 
to almost any state under the rule of democracy.”42 To Loewenstein, this science is a 
“rationalized and pre-calculated routine progressing, step by step, on the basis of experience and 
precedent,” and is aided by democracy itself.43 Although not fully explained, what Loewenstein 
is claiming is that the institutions of democracy provide fascism with the tools needed for the 
destruction of the existing government.44 
 This passage is, for several reasons, one of the most important of the article. 
Loewenstein’s description of the way in which fascism actually utilizes the democratic process 
to destroy democracy itself is important. While he is by no means the first scholar to highlight 
the problems of relying on democratic ideals alone to protect the democratic state, he is one of 
the first to propose the solution that is first alluded to in “Autocracy Versus Democracy.” This 
passage is the beginning of what eventually will evolve in later articles into his theory of militant 
democracy. As he succinctly summarizes, in many fascist states, “the democratic constitution 
became the main obstacle against [the state’s] maintenance and the best tool for its 
destruction.”45 
 According to Loewenstein, this phenomenon can be readily observed in the 
circumstances surrounding Hitler’s rise to power in Germany. While much of Hitler’s appeal 
came from his ability to tap into the public’s anger with the Treaty of Versailles and the other 
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Western powers, he would have never been able to assume power (or even rise beyond a petty 
demagogue) without being enabled by the “generous and lenient Weimar republic,” which 
fashioned the mechanisms for its own doom by allowing “the existence of a resolute competition 
to the legal authority of the state.”46 For Loewenstein, the Weimar government was destined to 
failure “from the beginning... because it was pacifist47 instead of militant.”48 Here, again, the 
seeds (and even language) of his later writings can be observed, and by providing concrete 
evidence of the validity of his analysis, Loewenstein makes the threat posed by fascism to 
democracies seem all the more acute. If democratic governments wait until the fascists have 
begun to implement their scientific process, it is too late. The defensive measures must be 
undertaken proactively, and long before the fascist party prepares to assume power.  
After reviewing the actual process by which a fascist government subverts a democratic 
state, Loewenstein begins his specific examination of the prospects of each remaining 
democratic nation for becoming fascist in “Autocracy Versus Democracy in Central Europe, II,” 
again published in in the American Political Science Review in 1935. For the purposes of this 
thesis, the importance of these predictions lies in what they reveal about Loewenstein’s 
understanding of fascism and his worldview in 1935, and not in their eventual accuracy, as eerily 
prescient as they may be. Much of Loewenstein’s analysis here rests on his contention that, 
beyond economic prosperity, the single most important factor in determining a nation’s ability to 
                                                
46  Loewenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” 580. 
 
47  Independent of the historical accuracy of Loewenstein’s statement (the Weimar government was not 
especially pacifist) it is instructive in the way in which he regarded Weimar during this time period, as well as his 
evolving theory of militant democracy.   
 
48  Loewenstein, “Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” 580. 
 
 24 
 
resist fascism is its tradition of democracy.49 If “self-government and democracy is lacking [the 
nation is] more susceptible to fascist propaganda and therefore more exposed to surreptitious 
change of government.”50  
Loewenstein begins with the Balkan states, for which he does not have high hopes of a 
continued relationship with democratic principles. He has particular reservations about Rumania, 
which can be seen as more an “autocracy than as a constitutional state,” as while the 1923 
Rumanian constitution describes the Rumanian government as a constitutional monarchy, in 
reality the state is run by a government class composed of traditional aristocrats and wealthy 
landowners, who make up almost all members of the parliament.51 A similar system can be 
found in Yugoslavia and Hungary, and while early fascist efforts in Bulgaria (supported by 
German money) have not been particularly successful up until 1934, the growing popularity of 
anti-Semitic and racist rhetoric among Bulgarian leaders does not bode well for the nation’s 
continued resistance to fascism.52  
Of note is the importance of anti-Semitism53 to the acceptability of fascism implied by 
Loewenstein here – to him, fascism benefits from a popular acceptance of anti-Semitic beliefs, as 
this acceptance can serve as a rallying cry for a dispirited population, with Jews functioning as 
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an easy scapegoat for fascist rhetoric. In Bulgaria, with a long tradition of “popular animosity 
towards Jews,” especially among the rural population, anti-Semitism could serve as a wedge by 
which fascism could conceivably force itself into the Bulgarian government, and could prove 
more powerful than the nation’s legacy of constitutional monarchy.54 
Loewenstein next examines Greece. Following a period of turmoil, a democratic 
constitution was established in 1927, and a period of peace lasted until 1935, when tensions 
between the two political parties spilled into the streets, and the Venizelists attempted to 
overthrow the Tsaldaris government.55 Faced with a “resolute government in command of the 
ordinary military powers,” this attempt failed, and prompted constitutional reform that helped 
further concentrate power in the hands of the government party.56 While at first glance this 
successful resistance would be a promising sign for continued democracy in Greece, the 
subsequent concentration of power, and the actions that prompted this concentration, have 
followed “the beaten track of quasi-fascist methods,” which so often end in full blown fascism. 
Further, Loewenstein views recent agitation by Greeks for a reestablishment of the traditional 
monarchy as nothing more than an attempt to implement a “veiled form of autocratic rule.”57 
Thus, Greece is yet another example of a country that has poor prospects for resisting 
fascism. Interestingly, the path followed by the Greek government in instituting constitutional 
reforms to help resist internal disorder is similar in some ways to Loewenstein’s own idea of 
militant democracy – a proactive attempt by a sitting democratic government to head off 
emerging threats. Clearly such an attempt carries with it an implicit danger of enabling the ruling 
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party to entrench themselves within a state, and while Loewenstein never articulates this 
concern, it is important to bear in mind as he further develops his theory for the defense of 
democracy.58  
Loewenstein views Spain’s prospects in a similar light. Like Germany, during the 1920s 
Spain “failed to build up a strong middle-class party holding the balance between right and left,” 
leading to an ill-timed revolt by the leftist parties against the state and military.59 With little 
prospect of succeeding, this revolt will serve as a pretext for the Spanish right to further entrench 
themselves in power, using the “menace of dictatorship of the proletariat... for the organization 
of a ruthless white terror preparing the way for the establishment of fascist or authoritarian 
rule.”60 In this prediction, Loewenstein sees a similarity to the destruction of the Weimar state, 
wherein the tension (and open conflict) between the left and the right has provided enough 
“hatred to bid for a ferocious application of the fascist suppression.”61 
Loewenstein finds Czechoslovakia to be an especially interesting case. Democracy has 
functioned well under the benevolent leadership of President Masaryk, demonstrating what 
Loewenstein terms the “vitality of the democratic idea” – a phrase that seems to hint at his true 
feelings towards his subject matter. Further, Czechoslovakia is one of the few nations to actively 
implement prohibitions on fascist activity, especially of Nazi sympathizers, thereby fulfilling 
some of the precepts of Loewenstein’s prescribed defense of democracy. Yet, despite these 
positive signs, the continued agitation of Germany for recognition of German nationals, and the 
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growing support these nationals have found within Czechoslovakia, does not bode well for the 
future of the state.  
 Although never explicitly mentioned, Loewenstein here seems to be admitting that even 
an active defense against fascism may not be sufficient to protect the democratic institutions of a 
state. Such an acknowledgement seems to cast doubt on Loewenstein’s entire theory of militant 
democracy – as well as further emphasizes the threat posed by fascism. Unsurprisingly, 
Loewenstein does not elaborate on this subject, and as he continues to write on this topic 
throughout the 1930s, he presents his theory of militant democracy as a thoroughly effective tool 
for preserving a democratic state.  
 Loewenstein holds out high hopes for the Scandinavian states. Although Germany has 
spent considerable time and money attempting to develop fascist parties in Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark, none of these parties have taken hold among the citizenry.62 With a politically 
educated population well versed in democracy, as well as surprisingly resilient economies that 
have to this point shown little signs of depression, there is almost no prospect of any of these 
countries of becoming fascist.63 Sweden, in particular, can be seen as one of the strongest 
democracies in Europe due to its proactive defense against militarism and fascism. In 1933 and 
1934 Sweden’s parliament “used their [powers] to enact the necessary legislation against the 
fascist propaganda,” outlawing uniforms, badges and other insignias of party allegiance.64 Even 
in Finland, where an extremist right wing has found some popularity, the presence of a strong 
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middle class acts as a countervailing political force, ensuring that these extremists will never find 
a popular audience for their rhetoric.65 
 Like the Scandinavian States, Belgium has few prospects of becoming fascist, unless 
France, Belgium’s closest ally (and national home to many of its citizens) were to fall to fascism. 
With a tradition of democracy, and a responsive, “elastic” parliamentary system, Belgium has 
reacted well to the Great Depression.66 While discussing Belgium, Loewenstein makes his first 
reference to the United States, commenting that, faced with economic instability, Belgium, like 
the United States, delegated “vast [economic] powers to the government for a given period.”67 
Loewenstein here is alluding to the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Roosevelt’s and 
the American Congress’ quick approval of government programs to shore up the economy, and 
is thus implying that America, like Belgium, has the necessary flexibility to resist a fascist threat.  
 Moving on to Switzerland, Loewenstein predicts that, despite a vocal fascist movement, 
“Swiss fascism has already reached its climax.”68 Lacking a charismatic, first-rate leader, and 
confronted by the “institutions of free self-government,” the Swiss fascist parties are beginning 
to dissolve.69 Unfortunately, despite these positive developments, the Swiss tradition of resolving 
important questions by public referendum may be the nation’s undoing, as fascists have proven 
to be particularly effective at winning popular votes through coercive techniques.70 This 
prediction is consistent with Loewenstein’s earlier, insightful observation of the unique way in 
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which democratic institutions, acting with good intentions, may actually enable fascism to 
succeed. 
 Loewenstein next turns to France, the “unknown x in the political equation of Europe” 
that is “the critical point in the battle waging between dictatorial and democratic rule.”71 Since 
1870 France has become increasingly democratic, and the French people, buoyed by an educated 
middle class, “are still imbued with the traditional ideology of liberalism and deeply conscious of 
the shortcomings of the communist and fascist paradises.”72 Unfortunately, despite this 
appreciation for democratic ideals, France throughout the 1930s has been wracked by political 
and parliamentary instability, and “scandals of far-reaching consequence.”73 Here, Loewenstein 
is clearly referring to the Stavisky Affair, and the procession of discredited and unpopular 
governments that followed.  
In December 1933, an investigation into failed pawnshops in Bayonne, France, revealed 
an extensive bond-selling scheme overseen by Serge Alexandre Stavisky, a Russian born Jew.74 
Faced with imminent arrest, Stavisky fled to Switzerland, where he was cornered by French 
police, and committed suicide.75 Throughout January and February 1934 the far right French 
press presented the suicide as a murder intended to cover up Stavisky’s ties to powerful French 
politicians, forcing the resignation of premier Camille Chautemps, who was replaced by Edouard 
Daladier. Dalaider immediately acted to remove the conservative prefect of the Paris police, Jean 
Chiappe, prompting a series of demonstrations and riots that came to a head on February 6, 1934, 
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when far right protestors engaged in open street fighting with elements of the French left and 
police forces.76 In the aftermath of the riots, Daladier resigned, inaugurating several years of 
constant political unrest and turmoil, and reinforcing the belief of a large portion of the French 
populace that their government was unalterably corrupt.77  
 These scandals, as well as a poorly written constitution that provides no protections for 
democracy itself, has left France “in permanent danger of a revolution.”78 Beyond the 
consequences of a populous, economically viable nation falling to fascism, France’s fate is in 
particular tied to the fate of Europe at large. France, allied with England, acts as the continental 
anchor of the Great Power alliance that defeated Germany in World War I and has attempted to 
govern European affairs since. Unfortunately, with a low birth rate and a population decimated 
by trench warfare, France is unable to bear this burden, and is, “in the position of an elderly man 
who undertakes a mountaineering excursion far beyond his real strength, but keeps up the 
appearance of enjoying it.”79 This need to maintain appearances only further exacerbates the 
domestic unrest, and France is at a crisis point, after which the existing state of affairs can no 
longer continue. The most obvious manifestation of this crisis is the growing presence of militant 
forces of the right and left. These forces showcase a special dilemma within France: any sign of 
upheaval may tip the nation over the brink into civil war, as both leftist and rightist groups are 
waiting for a sign of provocation to again spill into the streets.80 Loewenstein fears that in 
France, just as in Spain, the unstable situation may necessitate the application of “fascist 
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methods” by the French ministries such as “martial rule and the suppression of the civil rights to 
cope with a disturbance of order and safety,” thereby paving the way for a fascist takeover.81  
 In contrast to the instability of France, Great Britain stands as one of the lynchpins of 
democracy in Europe, and can be considered immune from fascism.82 Although Great Britain has 
suffered under the Great Depression, the fact that the populace has a  “time-honored acceptance 
of democratic ideals and institutions,” as well as a tradition of compromise and free debate, 
guarantees that England will easily resist fascist pressure.83 Britain’s democratic tradition has 
proven so strong that the House of Commons has thus far declined to take legislative (or military 
democratic) steps to prohibit the display of private military uniforms, believing that such steps 
are unnecessary in the face of the widespread support for the sitting government.84 
 Loewenstein also briefly reviews the prospects for the rise of fascism in America. At this 
point, Loewenstein believes that 
 [America is] so remote from the European experience in fascism and the ideology of fascism 
is so alien to America thought, nourished by British traditions of self-government over a long 
period, that it seems unreasonable to expect the appearance or growth of any brand of European 
fascism. The effort of some irresponsible elements – adventurers or idealists – to import the 
European brand of fascism and dictatorship seems hopeless.85 
 
Despite this hopeful assessment, Loewenstein adds a cautionary note, warning that “confidence 
in the superiority of democratic institutions and belief in the soundness and reasonableness of the 
masses do by no means suffice to safeguard the existing order.”86 If the American economy 
continues to struggle, and fails to absorb the large masses of unemployed, America could, at 
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some later point, conceivably see the growth of a national fascist movement.87 Even the nations 
with the strongest democratic traditions, and populations whose traditions run counter to fascist 
ideology, still harbor the potential to cultivate a fascist movement. No country is entirely safe. 
** 
 
 Overall, Loewenstein does not hold high hopes for the future of democracy in Europe. 
Beyond a few nations with a long tradition of democratic rule – most notably England and 
America – virtually every nation is susceptible to an internal fascist takeover. While this 
pessimistic analysis is to some extent the result of Loewenstein’s own personal experiences with 
fascism, in many ways it is completely in line with Loewenstein’s own explanation for the 
success of fascism, and his criteria for the susceptibility of a nation to fascist takeover. The 
majority of nations with a poor prospect for continued democracy are in the grips of economic 
turmoil and depression, have no tradition of democracy, and have populations that possess long-
held discriminatory beliefs, especially anti-Semitism.  
 Yet, despite his gloomy outlook, Loewenstein at this point still approaches the subject of 
fascism through an attempt at academic objectivity. In 1935, his pessimism has not become full 
blown, and he still harbors hope that some nations will be able to resist the fascist allure. Even if 
this is not the case and fascism conquers the whole of Europe, as he points out early in 
“Autocracy Versus Democracy I,” this change could simply be the next step in the evolution of 
political systems throughout Europe, and is a natural consequence of the changing worldview of 
the west throughout the twentieth century. In short, it is possible that the intellectual sun has set 
on democracy, and, just as with earlier, discredited, political beliefs, it is time for a new system 
to fill the vacuum. Further, he gives no hint that the United States is at any risk of falling to 
fascism. Even though by 1935 the American economy had collapsed, setting into motion 
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spiraling unemployment, Loewenstein sees virtually no chance of fascism taking root in 
America.  
** 
 Loewenstein followed up “Autocracy Versus Democracy in Central Europe, I and II” 
with two more articles about how democratic governments could resist fascist overthrow, 
“Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I and II,” published in 1937. Just as with 
“Autocracy Versus Democracy,” “Militant Democracy I and II” must be examined within the 
context of the continuing political developments in Europe.88 During the two years between the 
articles, the position of democracy has declined throughout Europe. In 1935 fascist Italy invaded 
and conquered Ethiopia, one of the few remaining independent African nations, and in 1936 
Hitler successfully remilitarized the Rhineland, which had previously been demilitarized in 
accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, as well as concluded a treaty with Italy, creating the 
Axis alliance that would serve as the backbone of a new fascist and authoritarian alliance 
structure throughout Europe. While the fascist nations prospered, and Germany continued its 
rapid rearmament and economic transformation, the remaining democratic powers suffered under 
the economic deprivations of the Great Depression, as well as an increasingly radicalized and 
divisive political climate. In 1936 the Spanish Civil War broke out between the rightist General 
Franco, supported by Germany and Italy, and the leftist Nationalist groups, loyal to the Spanish 
republic, leading to a brutal multi-year conflict. 
 In “Militant Democracy I and II,” Loewenstein fully realizes his theory of militant 
democracy, and is able, with examples of existing legislation, to articulate how a democratic 
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nation can, through legislative measures, protect itself from the scientific methods of fascism 
described in “Autocracy Versus Democracy.” Loewenstein’s tone in these articles is markedly 
different than his earlier work. Compared to 1935, he has become more personally invested in 
defending democracy, is much more anxious about the threat posed by fascism to the west, and is 
one step further along in his transition from academic to advocate.  
 Loewenstein begins “Militant Democracy and Fundamental Rights, I” by briefly 
summarizing what fascism is and the development of the historical growth of the facist political 
movement, which has “developed into a universal movement which in its seemingly irresistible 
surge is comparable to the rising of European liberalism.”89 While this section is similar to 
“Autocracy Versus Democracy,” of note is his distinction between constitutionalism, which 
“guarantees rationality and calculability of administration while preserving a definite sphere of 
private law and fundamental rights,” and fascism, which has “substitution [of] the rule of law 
[for] legalized opportunism.”90 This distinction is at odds with his earlier description of fascism 
as a science, which reflects his growing involvement in the conflict between fascism and 
democracy, and the fervor with which he believes fascism must be stopped.  
 Loewenstein’s feelings towards fascism are also shown in his description of a “fascist 
International of the multi-colored shirts… transcending national borders and cutting deeply 
across historical diversities of traditionally disjoined nationalisms.”91 By describing a linked 
worldwide network of fascist states and suggesting that no differences truly exist between the 
fascist regimes in Italy, Germany and Spain, Loewenstein is revealing his growing anxiety. He 
believes that fascism is a united, encroaching worldwide conspiracy that threatens the few 
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remaining democratic nations. According to Loewenstein, further evidence of the existence of 
this conspiracy can seen in in the leaders of the fascist nations, as they show a “similarity of… 
personalities.”92 
 After this brief overview, Loewenstein begins his analysis of how democratic nations fall 
to fascism, and how this process can be prevented by legislative and legal means. Loewenstein 
first describes this idea, termed militant democracy, by arguing that if democracy wishes to 
continue as a relevant and existent political mode, and is “not convinced that it has not yet 
fulfilled its destination, it must fight on its own plane a technique which serves only the purposes 
of power. Democracy must become militant.”93 Loewenstein devotes the rest of “Militant 
Democracy I,” and all of “Militant Democracy II,” to describing this technique, which is the 
basis of much of his later relevance as a political theorist, and is clear evidence of his growing 
advocacy for democracy, as well as his mounting personal stake in the defense of democratic 
institutions. 
 For Loewenstein, much of fascism’s success has been “based on its perfect adjustment to 
democracy,” thus allowing, as he first pointed out in “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” the use of 
democratic institutions for their own destruction. Key to this destruction is the understanding by 
fascists that “democracy could not, without self-abnegation, deny to any body of public opinion 
the full use of the free institutions of speech, press, assembly, and parliamentary participation.”94 
Fascists use these institutions for their own gain, working to “systematically discredit the 
democratic order and make it unworkable by paralyzing its functions until chaos reigns.”95 They 
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then seize on this deadlock as justification for their own alternative program, and are able, 
through effective propaganda and emotional appeal, to garner widespread public support for a 
proposed solution to a problem originally of their own making. In short, “the mechanism of 
democracy is the Trojan horse by which the enemy enters the city,” and fascists have slipped into 
power while democratic fundamentalists have sat idly by, naively hoping that democratic 
principles themselves would protect the existing order.96  
 The only solution to this threat is for democracy to take steps to actively defend itself. 
Fascism can only “be defeated… on its own plane and by its own devices, [and] mere 
acquiescence and optimistic belief in ultimate victory of the spirit over force only encourages 
fascism without stabilizing democracy.”97 Thus, democracies must take legal steps to limit the 
institutions that fascism exploits, namely freedom of speech and press, two rights that 
Loewenstein terms fundamental.98  By denying fascists these rights, democracies are able to 
proactively remove their opponents’ best tools for raising popular support, thereby guaranteeing 
that fascists will never have the popularity to attempt a takeover, through legal means or 
otherwise. While proponents of democracy have long been hesitant to interfere with freedom of 
speech, Loewenstein believes that, faced with the reality of fascism’s success throughout Europe, 
“legalistic self-complacency and suicidal lethargy [is giving] way to a better grasp of realities.”99 
 This idea is the key to Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy, and is, in many ways, 
the fundamental explanation for both the rest of his academic work, as well as his public efforts, 
over the next decade. Unlike in “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” Loewenstein now has a 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
96  Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy I,” 425. 
 
97  Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy I,” 430. 
 
98  Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy I,” 430. 
 
99  Loewenstein, “Militant Democracy I,” 431. 
 37 
 
solution to the threat posed by fascism. By restricting the democratic institutions that fascism 
uses to such great effect, fascists will be deprived of the necessary means to gain power, and thus 
will never pose a threat in the first place.100 By preemptively heading off fascism before fascists 
gather enough power to attempt a takeover, or force the issue during an emergency, democracy 
can proactively guarantee its continued security.101 
 An example of this style legislation can be seen in a law passed in March 1937 by the 
Belgian parliament to “prevent resignation from parliamentary seats merely for the sake of 
facilitating propaganda at the ensuing by-elections.”102 The passage of this law, which acts to 
limit the freedom of elected officials in hopes of depriving fascists with a useful propaganda tool, 
is a “clear indication of the growing unwilling[ness] of democracies to lend parliamentary 
institutions to the fascist technique of exploiting them for selfish ends.”103  
  Loewenstein’s language and tone here are of particular interest. Throughout his 
description of militant democracy, and his defense of its principles, Loewenstein repeatedly 
employs martial language and metaphors. To him, the current conflict between fascism and 
democracy is similar to the conflict between democracy and the needs of a mobilized state seen 
during World War I, and there “democracies withstood the ordeal of the World War much better 
than did autocratic states – by adopting autocratic methods.”104 As in recent wartime, when “few 
objected to the temporary suspension of constitutional principles for the sake of national self-
defense,” defenders of democracy should understand the immediate need to abandon some of 
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their principles in the short term. Europe is under “a virtual state of siege,” and “during war… 
legality takes a vacation.”105  
The effect of Loewenstein’s language here is twofold. First, it reveals the extent to which 
he has become personally involved in this war – the conflict between autocracy and democracy 
is not, as in 1935, a subject viewed with academic detachment. Now, instead, it is a cause to 
agitate for, and defeating fascism is a battle cry to which Loewenstein himself is rallying. It 
would not be an exaggeration to go so far as to describe his language here as verging on the 
hysteric. By describing Europe in these terms, Loewenstein is also revealing his own 
increasingly pessimistic worldview. To him, Europe is on the brink, and the most extreme 
measures (“every possible effort”) must be undertaken to prevent it from tumbling over the edge 
and into the chaos of fascism.106 At this point, there is no question of how Loewenstein views his 
subject matter: he wants democracy to continue, and, in the defense of democracy, the ends 
justify the means.  
 Second, by using military language to describe the European political situation, and 
exaggerating the threat to the European democracies – only two years earlier England was 
described as immune to fascism – Loewenstein is using fascism’s own appeal to drum up support 
for militant democracy. As he has discussed repeatedly, fascism is grounded in emotion, and 
fascist parties make great use of the emergency situation, frequently using expediency as a 
justification for a quick transition to a fascist government. Loewenstein is essentially (and 
ironically) performing the same act. To him, the threat to democracy is so dire, and so apparent, 
that actions must immediately be taken – democracy “must live up to the demands of the 
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hour.”107 Such an appeal is the essence of emotionalism. Just as the fascists use the threat of 
economic depression to mobilize a population, Loewenstein is attempting to use fascism to 
mobilize a government. To him, democratic governments must immediately follow the course 
laid out by him or risk destruction. There is something fundamentally different from simply 
proscribing the means by which a democratic government can protect itself from fascism, and 
casting the conflict between democracy and fascism as an apocalyptic and historic clash of 
worldviews. The fact that Loewenstein is doing the latter is significant, and has up until this 
point been glossed over by scholars working with his theories. Further, the stark differences 
between “Militant Democracy I” and “Autocracy Versus Democracy” are obvious, and show his 
increasingly pessimistic worldview, his growing personal involvement in the defense of 
democracy, his mounting anxiety, and his ongoing transition from academic to advocate.  
** 
 
 Loewenstein continues his discussion of militant democracy in his next article, “Militant 
Democracy and Fundamental Rights II.” Here he surveys specific European legislation that 
demonstrates the effectiveness of his earlier general arguments on what democracies must do to 
defend themselves against fascism. The countries covered by Loewenstein in this article include 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, England, the Irish Free State, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, 
Finland, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia – a list that for all intents and purposes contains all of 
the remaining democratic nations left in Europe.108  
 Loewenstein categorizes anti-fascist legislation into fourteen different types, all of which, 
despite local or national differences, display “considerable uniformity... corresponding to the 
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uniformity of the fascist technique undermining the democratic technique.”109 The most 
successful of these legislations are those enacted quickly, as “unduly delayed legislation [have] 
found it increasingly difficult to quell movements that had already cast their spell and taken root 
in the public attention.”110  
 The first type of legislation is those laws meant to deal with “open rebellion, insurrection, 
armed uprising,” and other types of open conflict between fascists and the democratic 
government.111 While in most cases open rebellion can be easily be dealt with by a nation’s 
existing police and military forces, Switzerland (1934, 1936), Czechoslovakia (1923) and 
Belgium (1934) have “strengthen[ed] their political codes or… [introduced] special legislation 
against high treason” to head off the threat from a fascist uprising.112 The second type of 
legislation is those laws that attempt to limit fascism by “proscribing subversive movements 
altogether.”113 While this is the most direct way of stopping fascist groups, in particular 
specifically outlawing their existence, few legislatures have pursued this route. In general, those 
nations which have outlawed extremist groups, do so indiscriminately, and avoid a “[s]pecific 
legal definition of what constitutes a subversive party.”114  
 The third and fourth types of laws are those that restrict private paramilitary groups and 
the wearing of military uniform and badges. Such laws have been passed by most democratic 
nations, and work to “strike at the roots of the fascist technique of propaganda, namely, self-
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advertisement and intimidation of others.”115 These laws have not proved particularly 
controversial, other than in Germany, which repealed a federal ordinance prohibiting private 
armies in 1932 after only two months.116 Similar to the third and fourth types, the fifth type of 
law is a prohibition of the private manufacture, use and possession of firearms or other weapons. 
As part of these prohibitions, according to Loewenstein a “vigilant police force should be in 
position to prevent at least any large-scale accumulation of arms in private hands.”117 Although 
never stated, Loewenstein clearly believes that the threat implicit in this law is not particularly 
potent, considering the poor track record of fascism in overthrowing a democratic government 
through outright revolution. 
 The sixth type of laws are those that “deal with abuse of parliamentary institutions by 
political extremism.”118 While not popular, these laws act to deprive a fascist group of its legally 
represented spokesperson, thereby taking “the edge... off subversive propaganda.”119 Similar to 
the sixth type, although less severe, the seventh type of law is one that aims at “curbing excesses 
of political strife.”120 Passed in Canada, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, these laws seek to 
prevent “political acrimony when it was directed against persons or classes of persons or 
institutions usually singled out for attack by fascism” by “forbidding incitement and 
agitation.”121 
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 The eighth type of law seeks to prevent fascists from creating disturbances through 
“organized hooliganism,” by curbing their right to assembly.122 These laws, as well the ninth 
type and tenth type – laws that limit fascist speech – are examples of laws that curb a 
fundamental right. These laws are the embodiment of Loewenstein’s idea of militant democracy, 
and the reluctance of democratic nations from adopting them (they are the “thorniest problem of 
democratic states”) reveals the difficulty of convincing democratic nations to utilize autocratic 
techniques as part of their own defense.123 As Loewenstein warns, “democracies that have gone 
fascist have gravely sinned by their leniency [of speech], or by too legalistic concepts of freedom 
of public opinion.”124  
 Part of any war is the maintenance of a standing army, and the eleventh type of law 
attempts to “protect [a nation’s] armed forces against infiltration by subversive propaganda.”125 
History has proven that “fascism is, on the whole, not unfavorably received by officers of the 
armed forces,” and some countries, including Belgium (1934) and Great Britain (1934), have 
enacted laws above and beyond existing military regulations that are “designed to curb 
incitement to disaffection among the armed forces.”126 Unfortunately, these laws have done little 
to target fascism directly, and have been mainly (and misguidedly) aimed at communism,127 
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which Loewenstein clearly does not consider a threat to democracies in the way that fascism 
is.128 Similar measures have been undertaken to protect civil offices and public officials in the 
same way, and these measures constitute the twelfth type of law.129 
 The thirteenth type of law is perhaps the most controversial and proactive measure a 
democratic state can undertake, and involves the creation of a police force devoted solely to the 
“discovery, repression, supervision, and control of anti-democratic and anti-constitutional 
activities and movements.”130 While Loewenstein believes a force along these lines should be 
“established in any democratic state at war against fascism” – therefore all democratic states – 
by 1937 only Switzerland and the Scandinavian states have pursued this strategy, and only along 
limited lines.131 Loewenstein believes it is imperative for democratic nations to follow “the 
example of the dictatorial and authoritarian states,” including “making it an offense [for all 
citizens] not to report to the competent authorities information concerning unlawful and 
subversive activities.”132   
 The final type of laws are those that attempt to “parry [the] subversive activities directed 
against the state from the outside,” in particular fascist and anti-democratic propaganda.133 While 
nothing can be done to prohibit foreign radio broadcasts, Loewenstein believes that democratic 
states should work to prohibit “the political activities of foreigners or alien emissaries on national 
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territory,” and censor foreign newspapers.134 Just as with the thirteenth law, such laws would in 
practice stifle a population’s access to information, again demonstrating the ferocity with which 
Loewenstein believes democratic countries must confront fascism. This, in turn, emphasizes the 
implied threat of fascism. To him, such extreme measures are the only appropriate response to 
the calamity that is laying siege to Europe. 
 After reviewing the fourteen different types of anti-fascist legislation, Loewenstein 
makes a surprisingly optimistic observation, in contrast to his earlier dire predictions. He 
believes that “at last, the terrifying spell of fascism’s basilisk gaze has been broken… the fascist 
technique has been discerned and is being met by effective counteraction.”135 Despite this 
hopeful prediction, Loewenstein cannot help but end the article pessimistically, commenting that 
democracy should not be lulled by a false sense of optimism, and that democracy must undergo a 
transformation “of obsolete forms and rigid concepts into the new instrumentalities of 
“disciplined,” or even – let us not shy away from the word – “authoritarian,” democracy.”136  
** 
 
The progression from “Autocracy Versus Democracy,” published in 1935, and “Militant 
Democracy I & II,” published in 1937 is clear. In the former articles Loewenstein still attempts 
to approach the conflict between fascism and democracy as an objective academic. By 1937 this 
attempt at objectivity has been abandoned, and Loewenstein is an obvious supporter of the 
democratic system. His solution to the way in which fascism is able to subvert democracy for its 
own ends, first hinted at in 1935, is now fully formed, and can be seen as a complete formula for 
the defense of democracy. Implicit in this development is Loewenstein’s mounting anxiety about 
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the threat posed by fascism to the west, an anxiety that is fundamentally informed by his own 
pessimism. While by this point Loewenstein is still confining his message to academic 
publications, he is one step closer to the full-blown public campaign for the defense of the 
democracy that he would soon lead. In that context, “Militant Democracy I & II” can be seen as 
another step forward on his journey from academic to advocate.  
** 
 
 In 1938 Loewenstein published another pair of articles, “Legislative Control of 
Extremism in European Democracies I” and “Legislative Control of Extremism in European 
Democracies II,” in the Columbia Law Review. These articles describe, in very detailed and 
technical terms, the way in which fascist states operate, how democratic states can use legislative 
power to curb fascist threats, and, just as in “Militant Democracy,” what anti-fascist legislation 
currently exists.  
 Loewenstein begins “Legislative Control I” with a lengthy introduction that summarizes 
the history of fascism. His writing here is similar in content to his earlier articles, although of 
note in this section is his review of the history of “legislative measures designed to protect the 
existing form of constitutional governments and to repress activities considered as subversive” in 
America.137 Such laws have been passed during the American Revolution and throughout the 
nineteenth and twentieth century as part of the campaign to regulate immigration.138 More 
recently, when faced with the rise of the Ku Klax Klan in the years following World War I, 
several American states utilized legislation “intended to combat criminal syndicalism, anarchism 
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and sabotage” to root out Klan members.139 Despite the existence of such laws, which could be 
considered as militantly democratic, most legislative efforts have been primarily focused on 
stopping leftist and Communists and, “little attention… has been paid until recently to similarly 
subversive or destructive tendencies entertained by radical movements by the ‘right’ which are 
directed against the existing form of popular government.”140 Anti-fascist laws clearly fall into 
this category, and Loewenstein is in essence arguing that Americans have too long been 
concerned with threats from the left and not the right, and need to take steps to combat fascist 
tendencies.  
 Further, by mentioning America at all, Loewenstein is demonstrating his growing 
preoccupation with the idea of a fascist threat on American soil. While he does point out that “at 
present no serious threat exists that “authoritarian”… doctrines will penetrate into public opinion 
[in America],” he highlights a 1935 law passed by the State of New Jersey “designed to prevent 
the customary propaganda techniques of incipient National Socialist movements,” implying that 
similar laws should be adopted by other states.141 Clearly, Loewenstein is fearful of the fascist 
threat penetrating even America, the bastion of democracy.  
 While much of what is contained in “Legislative Control I and II” is simply a restatement 
of the content of the survey of anti-fascist legislation found in “Militant Democracy” in more 
technical language appropriate for a law journal, and therefore unnecessary to review, 
Loewenstein’s description of the conflict between fascism and democracy in Europe is 
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significant. Just as in “Militant Democracy,” Loewenstein describes the conflict as a war, and the 
“the war of doctrines… between fascism and democracy is in full swing.”142 In Europe,  
democracy serve[s] as a battle ground for local fascist or National Socialist movements which 
aim at replacing the democratic form of government with an “authoritarian” regime modeled on 
the pattern of Italy, Germany, or one of the minor satellites of European fascism.143 
 
These nations are exposed to “relentless propaganda” that is part of “a particular emotional 
technique of exploiting the existing democratic institutions rights for the vowed end of 
undermining and ultimately destroying democracy.”144 Similar to “Militant Democracy,” he 
characterizes the conflict as a war, lending his argument for the adoption of anti-fascist 
legislation an urgency that it would otherwise lack. While existing anti-fascist legislation shows 
a growing recognition that “the dangerous situation resulting from mere acquiescence or from 
the treacherous belief that, in the long run, the inherent superiority of democratic values will 
assert itself over fascist ideology,” more must be done.145 
 Also of note is Loewenstein’s repeated criticism of democracies that fail to enact 
proposed anti-fascist legislation out of a reluctance to limit the fundamental rights of their 
citizens. During his survey of European legislation, he highlights several failed measures – for 
example a proposed 1937 constitutional amendment in the Netherlands that would limit 
parliamentary participation of subversive parties – commenting that “thus once more 
fundamentalist scruples prevented the enactment of measures which, if applied, would have been 
an effective self-defense of parliamentarism against its uncompromising enemies.”146 
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Loewenstein’s message here is obvious, and echoes his earlier agitation for the quick passage of 
laws limiting the fundamental rights of fascists. For him, it is a waste of time to worry about how 
legislation against fascism could conceivably violate democratic principles, as relying solely on 
these principles is what has allowed the conflict with fascism to progress to the current 
emergency situation.  
 Loewenstein continues his survey in “Legislative Control of Extremism in European 
Democracies, II,” which was published shortly after “Legislative Control I.” Again the content of 
this article is similar to that of “Militant Democracy,” and attention will be paid only to 
particularly noteworthy passages. In the article, Loewenstein summarizes anti-fascist legislation 
that concerns party uniforms, military formation of political parties, legislation against the 
carrying of arms, legislation protecting democratic institutions, against political propaganda and 
legislation restricting free assembly and speech. Just as in “Militant Democracy,” Loewenstein 
recommends that democracies adopt strict legislation regulating free speech, and in particular the 
press, and act to limit the ability of fascist parties to use a nation’s press organs for disseminating 
anti-democratic propaganda.147 While such laws did exist in Weimar before Hitler’s takeover, the 
state was hamstrung by its reluctance to enforce its own legislation, and because of the “legalistic 
inhibitions of the courts and hesitant enforcement by the governmental agencies [of the law]” 
enabled its own destruction.148 Once again Loewenstein is emphasizing that democratic 
principles are insufficient, and that only certain restrictive laws enforced without hesitation can 
protect democratic states. 
 While “Legislative Control of Extremism in European Democracies, I and II” do not 
show a marked changed in his idea of militant democracy, his tone throughout, especially in the 
                                                
147  Loewenstein, “Legislative Control II,” 755. 
 
148 Loewenstein, “Legislative Control II,” 755. 
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context of a law journal, further demonstrates the anxiety with which he regards the fascist 
threat, as well as his growing concern with the threat posed by fascism to America. 
 Loewenstein published another article on militant democracy in 1938, “The Balance 
Between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law” in The 
University of Chicago Law Review. While, again, much of the content of this article is identical 
to his earlier work (namely an in-depth summary of existing European legislation), significantly 
Loewenstein here argues for fundamental changes to the function and organization of legislative 
and executive bodies in democracies.  
 In his eyes, the traditional division between legislative and executive power is unsuited to 
the current political climate, and in particular the conflict between democracy and fascism. 
Instead, Loewenstein favors a small body other than a large elected parliament in order to 
guarantee quick decision-making during a crisis situation as “the classic task of the parliament, 
namely, law-making by deliberation and sanction, has been overridden by the need of swift 
decision which only a small body of men is suited to perform.”149 Faced with the reality of the 
twentieth century, the “tenaciously upheld postulate of a separation of legislative and executive 
(or administrative) action is unrealistic, obsolete and may become at times even dangerous.”150  
 While Loewenstein concedes that as part of this system “a rationalized method has to be 
found of how governmental leadership should be made amenable to political control of the 
people or their representatives,” he provides no detail about how this level of control should be 
accomplished.151 Further, despite this apparent acknowledgement of the importance of a check 
                                                
149  Karl Loewenstein, “The Balance Between Legislative and Executive Power: A Study in Comparative 
Constitutional Law,” The University of Chicago Law Review 5 (1938): 607. 
 
150  Karl Loewenstein, “The Balance Between Legislative and Executive Power,” 607. 
 
151  Karl Loewenstein, “The Balance Between Legislative and Executive Power,” 608. 
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on the power of the executive or legislature, Loewenstein argues that “the technical arguments” 
for a division of powers or “attendant checks and balances” are no longer valid.152 
 Loewenstein’s argument here is significant, and reveals his evolving understanding of 
what militant democracy is, constituting a second phase of his theory. What Loewenstein is 
describing here is a type of quasi-democracy that bears little resemblance to the traditional 
democratic system. Clearly, by believing that the structure of this new system should be defined 
through constitutional amendments within democratic states, what Loewenstein envisions is not 
a temporary solution to the threat posed by fascism to democracy. Instead, this new democracy, 
which strongly resembles autocratic governments, in certain aspects, through its “concentration 
of political action,” would be permanent. Thus, by 1938, Loewenstein believes that temporary 
antifascist legislation is insufficient to protect democracy alone. Now only a fundamental 
transformation of the democratic system in order to create a more powerful executive and a 
smaller, more responsive legislature can protect democracy from the threat it is faced with.   
Loewenstein’s mounting anxiety about fascism is implicit in this evolution. Faced with 
success of Nazi Germany, the threat posed by fascism demands more than temporary legislation. 
In line with this new understanding, Loewenstein began to argue for the adoption of militant 
democracy in techniques in America outside of academic publications, beginning a campaign of 
public advocacy that would last for almost a decade. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
152  Karl Loewenstein, “The Balance Between Legislative and Executive Power,” 608. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Advocate: Karl Loewenstein and the  
Public Campaign for Militant Democracy 
 
 
 
 
“This is the greatest national emergency in which this 
young and great nation finds itself after a  
hundred years of comparative peace and prosperity.”153 
 
 
 
On September 1, 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland, beginning a global conflict that 
would span six years and claim tens of millions of lives. For Karl Loewenstein and other 
defenders of democracy, the quick capitulation of Poland, and Germany’s dramatic victory over 
France less than a year later, only reinforced their fear of an inevitably, creeping fascist tide 
overtaking the west. Faced with this new reality, Loewenstein began to engage in a public 
campaign for the adoption of militant democratic techniques within America, arguing that such 
legislation was necessary to prevent the United States from being defeated by a Fifth Column of 
fascist loyalists.  
 Loewenstein waged this war on several fronts. Beginning with two book reviews 
published in The Nation that hinted at his theory of militant democracy, by 1940 and the fall of 
France Loewenstein undertook his campaign with a new urgency, speaking publicly in favor of 
antifascist legislation at Amherst College and during a lecture to the American Bar Association, 
                                                
153  Karl Loewenstein, “America’s Eleventh Hour.” Co-authored with Lawrence Packard. 1940. Karl 
Loewenstein Papers. Box 37, Amherst College, Massachusetts. 24. 
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where he argued for the quick passage of a Federal Order Act limiting the activities of fascist 
sympathizers. In these reviews and speeches, Loewenstein’s pessimism about the future of 
democracy, as well as anxiety about an impending fascist takeover of the United States are clear, 
and these sentiments appear in his public correspondence even after the American entrance into 
World War II and the defeat of Nazi Germany in early 1945. In 1944, with American victory in 
Europe imminent, The Nation published an editorial in which Loewenstein argued that in post-
war Germany, fascism, if not properly contained, would continue to pose a threat to America 
interests and democracy.  
Even after the end of the fighting, and during his tenure working with the occupying 
American forces as part of the American Military Government (OMGUS), Loewenstein still 
could not escape his anxiety about fascism. In a series of letters to the editor published in The 
New York Times in response to an article about the progress and effectiveness of denazification, 
he argued that denazification had failed, and Germany was rife with fascists and Nazis. The tone 
in these letters is remarkably similar to his writings during the peak of Hitler’s success in 
Europe, and only further demonstrates his furor as an antifascist.  
Throughout his writings and lectures, Loewenstein implicitly and explicitly refers back to 
his academic work on militant democracy, advocating at every turn for the adoption of strict 
antifascist legislation that would curb the ability of American fascists to take advantage of the 
democratic system in order to accomplish the destruction of the United States. To him, America 
was populated by a secret, undiscovered force of fascist loyalists who were prepared to act 
against the interests of the American people, and, if open warfare broke out, would aid the 
Germans in conquering America. The academic objectivity present in his early publications on 
militant democracy is absent. By 1940 and the collapse of France, Loewenstein was a full-
fledged soldier for democracy, doing whatever he could to protect democracy and his adopted 
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homeland, even presenting himself as a defender of traditional Anglo-Saxon Christian values. 
Beyond the significance of an academic going so far as to give public speeches urging the 
acceptance of his political theories, this body of correspondence shows the maturation in 
Loewenstein of the new worldview outlined earlier. 
Nevertheless, this new worldview, and the documents that show its development, are 
absent from the existing Loewenstein historiography. Even Lang’s lengthy Loewenstein 
biography glosses over his public advocacy for militant democracy, and the majority of 
publications discussed here are missing from his extensive Loewenstein bibliography. This 
historiographical deficiency is further evidence of the way in which scholars generally have, 
until this point, used Loewenstein, and that simply including him in a footnote as a way to 
introduce the idea of militant democracy misses a crucial element of both his theory, and the way 
in which émigré intellectuals confronted the political and military success of Nazi Germany.   
** 
 
 Loewenstein first alludes to militant democracy in non-academic publications in his The 
Nation154 book reviews of 1938 and 1939.155 In the first review, “Liberalism Restated,” 
published on July 16, 1938, Loewenstein reviews Communism, Fascism, or Democracy?, by 
                                                
154  “Liberalism Restated” and Loewenstein’s other articles published in The Nation, which advocate against 
fascism, were in tune with that publications overall editorial policy during this period. For examples of other articles 
that espouse similar views, see Albert Viton, “Italy Under Hitler,” The Nation, January 31, 1938; “Editorials,” The 
Nation, March 4, 1939; Alexander Worth, “France at Its Best,” The Nation, November 4, 1939; Robert Bendiner, 
“Imagination and the War,” The Nation, October 10, 1941. In general, The Nation was antifascist and favored 
intervention into Europe once the war began, and especially after the fall of France. Bendiner’s article is especially 
instructive in summarizing the overall editorial policy. To him, Hitler is a “little Vienesse psychopath,” and America 
must help stop him. Bendiner, “Imagination and the War,” 365.  
 
155  Around this period Loewenstein published a third book review in The Nation, “The Viscera of the Power 
Process,” on January 13, 1940. A detailed examination of this review is not included in this thesis, as in it 
Loewenstein does not allude to militant democracy, and instead primarily focuses on criticizing James Marshall’s 
Swords and Symbols: The Technique of Sovereignty. See Karl Loewenstein, “The Viscera of the Power Process,” 
The Nation, January 13, 1940, 51-52 and James Marshall, Swords and Symbols: The Technique of Sovereignty 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939). 
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Eduard Heimann.156 According to Loewenstein, Heimann, a “well-known German scholar now 
in this country,” is attempting to conceive of “democracy in its “original” compass as historically 
though not logically interrelated with capitalism, and traces in a masterly fashion the 
development of both fundamental concepts.”157 While much of the review focuses on 
summarizing Heimann’s work – which Loewenstein views favorably – in his critique of several 
of Heimann’s political predictions Loewenstein reveals his anxiety about fascism and lays the 
groundwork for his later, and much more urgent, advocacy for the passage of antifascist 
legislation. 
 In particular, Loewenstein finds fault with Heimann’s prediction for the future success of 
democracy based on the value of humanism, an argument that he characterizes as an “incurable 
idealism, perhaps the heritage of [Heimann’s] German education which belies his Marxist 
propensities.”158 Instead, to Loewenstein 
 [t]hings have gone too far in these hectic years since the war; the masses have become too  
 awakened, the bourgeois too frightened and too stubborn, the farmers too restless under the threat  
 of mechanization, and, above all, the militaristic spirit has penetrated too deeply into our  
 subconscious mind, to allow any idyllic solution which bases its arguments on the goodness or  
 the reasonable of human nature.159 
 
Sadly, this idyllic solution is incompatible with the realities of 1938, and “the impending 
catastrophe will pay little heed to utopian dreams or wishful thinking,” as “the terrified world 
already hears the hoofs of the apocalyptic horse clanging over the devastated fields of 
civilizations.”160  
                                                
156  See Eduard Heimann, Communism, Fascism, or Democracy? (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1938).   
 
157  Karl Loewenstein, “Liberalism Restated,” The Nation, July 16, 1938, 73. 
 
158  Loewenstein, “Liberalism Restated,” 74. 
 
159  Loewenstein, “Liberalism Restated,” 74. 
 
160  Loewenstein, “Liberalism Restated,” 74. 
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 While Loewenstein never explicitly states what this impending catastrophe is, his 
language here is remarkably similar to the language used earlier in “Militant Democracy I and 
II” to describe the conflict between democracy and fascism. Clearly, he believes that Heimann’s 
book, for all its virtues, fails to account for the threat posed by fascism to the democratic spirit, 
and that no logical or reasonable person could look on the coming years with optimism for the 
continued existence and prosperity for the institutions of democracy.161  
 This argument is important for several reasons. First, although Loewenstein’s comments 
contain no direct reference to militant democracy, or any hint at a possible solution for the 
impending apocalypse facing civilization, this review can be seen as the first step in a public 
campaign advocating the adoption of antifascist techniques. When read in the context of his 
earlier academic work, Loewenstein’s references to realism speak to the common belief among 
defenders of democracy that democratic principles alone are sufficient to protect a democratic 
state from fascism. This belief – an idyllic solution – is inadequate when confronted by the 
reality of fascist techniques, and idealism is meaningless when measured against the science of 
                                                
161  It is important to note that during this period, other émigré intellectuals advocated against Nazism. Perhaps 
the most notable of these was Carl J. Friedrich, a non-Jewish Germen immigrant, who as a well-known scholar of 
totalitarianism, helped the Council for Democracy to develop a pamphlet to counteract Nazi propaganda about Jews 
in 1941, an effort in which he was joined by Talcott Parsons, a prominent American sociologist who was an early 
activist against fascism. In producing this pamphlet, the Council queried well-known intellectuals on their opinions 
on anti-Semitism, as well their opinion on how America should respond to the threat posed by fascism. Replying to 
this questionnaire, Max Horkheimer, an émigré who was part of the prominent Frankfurt School, alluded to the 
necessity of pursuing militant democracy to combat anti-Semitism. Beyond publishing the aforementioned 
pamphlet, the Council also held public forums, published more pamphlets, and undertook media campaigns to 
advocate against fascism and anti-Semitism. For more on this topic see Joseph Bendersky, “Dissension in the Face 
of the Holocaust: The 1941 American Debate over Antisemitism,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies 24 (2010): 85-
116, as well as a blog article on Horkheimer by Bendersky, Joseph Bendersky, “Horkheimer, “Militant Democracy,” 
and War,” TELOScope the telos press blog (blog), Telos, March 14, 2009, 
http://www.telospress.com/main/index.php?main_page=news_articles&article_id=303. The pamphlet that was 
eventually produced was Nazi Poison: How We can Destroy Hitler’s Propaganda Against the Jews (New York: 
Council for Democracy, 1941). The only other direct reference to militant democracy style thinking that I have seen 
is in Neumann’s The Cultural Migration, where he, when discussing Roosevelt and the positive attributes of 
America, states “to the skeptical German, the Roosevelt system meant that the Wilsonianism which had been 
preached since 1917 was not a mere piece of propaganda, but a reality. It was a demonstrating that a militant 
democracy could solve the very same problems on which the German Republic collapse.” Neumann, The Cultural 
Migration, 18. While the sentiment behind Neumann’s statement clearly parallels Loewenstein’s work, it’s 
conceivable that by the time Neumann published the book – the 1960s – the phrase militant democracy had entered 
popular academic parlance.  
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fascist infiltration. Such writing is clear evidence of Loewenstein’s pessimistic worldview. He 
directly dismisses any idealistic vision of a future defined by democracy’s success. Instead – and 
clearly as a result of his own experience with fascism, as well as the forward march of Hitler and 
fascism across Europe throughout the 1930s – reality has shown that only by facing fascism 
head-on can democracy succeed in defeating the challenge it faces.  
Second, Loewenstein’s description of the growth of a militaristic spirit that has 
penetrated into the subconscious mind provides an interesting insight into Loewenstein’s own 
thinking. Clearly, his belief in a reformed democracy that militantly and legislatively responds to 
threats is a product of his own belief in the militarization of the modern day mind. When viewed 
in this way, militant democracy can be seen as a solution uniquely suited to the world in which it 
was conceived.  
Finally, simply through the act of using a book review as a medium to warn the public of 
the impending crisis, Loewenstein is revealing the urgency with which he has undertaken the 
defense of democracy. “Liberalism Restated” is a model for Loewenstein’s subsequent 
publications in The Nation. When given the opportunity, regardless of the circumstances, he 
attempts to warn the public of the threat posed by fascism, and by doing so, implicitly advocates 
for his unique solution to the crisis facing democracy.  
 This model is apparent in the second relevant book review of June 17, 1939. In “Collapse 
of the Weimar Republic,” he reviews Inside Germany, an account of the fall of the republic and 
the rise of the Nazi regime, written by Albert C. Grzesinski,162 a former Weimar government 
                                                
162  Grzesinski was a member of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) and was noted for his ruthless 
policies. He served as Prussian Minister of the Interior from October 6, 1926 until February 28, 1930, when 
revelations of an affair between Grzesinski and an American actress forced him to resign on February 28, 1930. He 
rejoined the government on November 6, 1930 as police president of Berlin, a post he had held earlier in his career. 
He was dismissed from this position as part of Franz von Papen’s coup in Prussia on July 20, 1932. He stayed out of 
politics for the remainder of his time in Germany, and fled Germany in 1933 after Hitler came to power. See 
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official.163 To Loewenstein, while Grzesinski’s account, to its credit, describes Weimar “without 
affectation or pretentious humility,” there is “surprisingly little in [his book] that is actually 
new.”164 Inside Germany fails to answer important questions about Weimar, especially about the 
conflict between Stresemann and German industry, which Grzesinski, because of his position in 
the government, could have provided particular insight into.  
 After identifying the deficiencies in Grzesinski’s work, Loewenstein presents his own 
explanation for Weimar’s collapse, referencing his earlier work on militant democracy. 
Loewenstein again advocates for antifascist legislation and a rigorous defense of democracy. 
According to him, Weimar did not collapse as the result of a poorly written constitution. Rather, 
 it failed through the peculiar misfortune of the Germans: that a good constitution was bungled by  
 incompetent or disloyal men. Few had the insight, and of these few none had the courage and the 
 power to reform and if necessary to wreck the overtowering machinery of the army, the  
 bureaucracy, and the courts which the republic had inherited from the imperial regime and which 
 were kept inviolate before deluded public opinion. The democrats… had not the courage of their 
 convictions.165 
 
America and the other democracies “commit the same sins of omission,” and “in discovering… 
the communistic mote in their neighbor’s eye [ignore] the fascist in their own.”166 The fall of 
Weimar was not unavoidable, and came about because “there was too much of civil rights in 
republican Germany, but for the wrong people, and too much militancy, but again by the wrong 
people.”167 
                                                                                                                                                       
Anthony Glees, “Albert C. Grzesinski and the Politics of Prussia, 1926-1930,” The English Historical Review 89 
(1974): 814-834. 
 
163  Albert C. Grzesinski, Inside Germany (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1939).  
 
164  Karl Loewenstein, “Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” The Nation, June 17, 1939, 706. 
 
165  Loewenstein, “Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” 706. 
 
166  Loewenstein, “Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” 706. 
 
167  Loewenstein, “Collapse of the Weimar Republic,” 707. 
 58 
 
 When compared to his academic publications, it is obvious to what Loewenstein is 
alluding. In Weimar, democrats, possessed of a belief in the infallibility of their democratic 
principles, granted access to their fundamental rights. The fascists, in turn, used these rights to 
destroy the democratic institutions, and implement their own system. In this failure Loewenstein 
sees a powerful warning that the remaining democracies must heed. As he first explained in 
1935, fascism defeats democracy through the false belief of democrats in the infallibility of their 
institutions, leading them to avoid taking necessary proactive defensive steps.  
Just as in “Liberalism Restated,” Loewenstein again is using a book review as a platform 
to warn the public about the consequences of a complacent democracy, although, unlike in 1938, 
he hints at a solution. Implicit in his description of the failures of Weimar, although never clearly 
stated, is the argument for the limitations of the civil rights for the wrong sort (fascists), the same 
argument at the core of Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy. Significantly, this 
implication can be seen as his first public description of the techniques of militant democracy, 
and an important development within his advocacy. Now Loewenstein is presenting the readers 
of The Nation with a description of the dilemma facing America, and hinting at a scheme by 
which democracy can be protected.  
** 
 
 Loewenstein first reveals this scheme in a speech given to members of the American Bar 
Association on September 11, 1940, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and here, for the first time,  
lays out a thorough plan for the prevention of fascist infiltration in America. The images and 
themes he stresses – in particular the idea of democracy acting as a Trojan Horse for fascism, and 
the threat to America posed by Fifth Column of hidden fascist sympathizers – appear in his 
public statements and writings throughout World War II and during the post-war period. As with 
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the The Nation reviews, no mention of this speech, or its subsequent coverage in The New York 
Times,168 appears in any of the secondary literature on Loewenstein.169  
 Like his earlier academic writing, Loewenstein’s speech must be examined within the 
historical context that it was given. Between the publication of “Collapse of the Weimar 
Republic,” and the Bar Association speech, World War II had begun and the position of 
democracy in Europe had considerably worsened. Germany’s conquest of Poland in 1939 had led 
to a tense standoff between German and Allied forces in the west. This pause in hostilities ended 
on May 10, 1940, when Germany launched Fall Gelb (Case Yellow), the planned invasion of 
France, Luxembourg and Belgium. Within a month-and-a-half the French forces had been 
routed, and on June 25 the French and Germans concluded an armistice, after which France was 
divided into a large German occupied territory and a smaller German client state, Vichy. Many 
observers believed that the key to Germany’s rapid victory was the infiltration of fascist 
sympathizers and saboteurs into France prior to the invasion, viewing this “Fifth Column” as an 
essential part of the Nazi strategy.170 
While the British Expeditionary Force was able to successfully evacuate back to England, 
thereby saving a remnant of the Allies’ land forces and the prospect of continued resistance, the 
quick collapse of France was an unmitigated disaster. As Loewenstein emphasized in “Autocracy 
vs Democracy” in 1935, France was the key to a continued democratic presence on the European 
                                                
168  See Lawrence E. Davies, “Bar Votes to Join Hemisphere Group,” The New York Times, September 12, 
1940. 
 
169  In the greater context of this thesis and Loewenstein’s historiography, this speech is an especially important 
example of the clear articulation between the temporary and permanent elements of militant democracy, the latter of 
which are missing entirely from most secondary sources on the subject.  
 
170  Richard Breitman and Allen Lichtman, FDR and the Jews (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 
161-183. For contemporary examples of fears about the Fifth Column and the role that this supposed group played 
in the fall of France, see “French Fall Laid to Vast Spy Plot,” The New York Times, July 7, 1940; William J. 
Donovan and Edgar Mowrer, “French Debacle Held Masterpiece of Fifth Columnists Under Hitler,” The New York 
Times, August 22, 1940; Otto D. Tolischus, “How Hitler Made Ready: The Fifth Column,” The New York Times, 
June 16, 1940 among others.  
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continent, and the destruction of one of the leading opponents of fascism represented a 
cataclysmic development in the war between the two ideologies. Faced with this development 
(and the apparent triumph of fascism it symbolized), Loewenstein redoubled his efforts to 
advocate for militant democracy, becoming even more anxious about fascism in the United 
States. 
This anxiety is apparent in his next speech, titled “A Federal Order Act Against 
Subversive Political Activities.” Here Loewenstein warns his audience of the existence, in an 
obvious reference to the fate of France, of a Fifth Column of fascist loyalists living within 
America and waiting to support Hitler in an attack on the United States.171 While there have 
always been native groups opposed to the national interest of the United States during any 
conflict throughout its history, the fascist Fifth Column is unique, as it can be supported by 
fascist governments abroad, without these governments “committing themselves directly” or 
publicly to this support, and is thus particularly dangerous to democracy.172 
 Similar groups existed across Europe during the 1930s, and only after the outbreak of 
World War II were these groups, composed of “German nationals173 as well as by citizens… 
[are] converted into Trojan horses who actively collaborated with the invaders in disintegrating 
                                                
171  Karl Loewenstein, “A Federal Order Act Against Subversive Political Activities” – Lecture to the 
American Bar Association. September 11, 1940. Karl Loewenstein Papers. Box 32, Folder 16, Amherst College, 
Massachusetts.  
 
172  Loewenstein, “Federal Order Act.” 
 
173  Loewenstein’s comments here are in part a reflection of the tumultuous political climate of America in the 
late 1930s and into 1940. While Hitler never funded a Nazi Party in the United States, even in America Hitler “had 
imitators and supporters,” in particular the German Bund, a loose coalition of several pro-Nazi groups, made up of 
mainly German immigrants. For more on the Bund, see Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United 
States 1924-1941 (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1990), 8-10. Beyond the Bund, the famous aviator Charles 
Lindbergh, one of the leading figures of the isolationist movement, held views that echoed the Nazi’s ideological 
racial thinking, and demonstrated a clear affinity for Germany. For more on Lindbergh, as well as presence of anti-
Semitism in America during this period (and in particular in the United States Army), see Joseph Bendersky, The 
“Jewish Threat”: Anti-Semitic Politics of the U.S. Army (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 277-279. Despite the 
prevalence of the Bund and Lindbergh (as well as the infamous anti-Semitic radio host Father Coughlin), 
Loewenstein never specifically refers to a particular group that he views as part of the Fifth Column.  
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national unity and aiding military occupation.”174 The United States must learn from the example 
of these European nations, and should pass “appropriate legislative measures” intended to keep 
“subversive activities under control.”175 According to Loewenstein, while the Bill of Rights and 
democratic principles would seem to argue against these legislative measures, 
 it should be remembered, however, that during emergency situations in the past - and at the  
 present our national institutions are more at stake than at any time since the foundation of our 
 national Republic, - legislative limitations of fundamental rights were sustained by the Supreme  
 Court.176 
 
This legislation should act to “curb all political activities of aliens which are harmful to national 
interests,” and, more importantly, monitor the activities of “American citizens whether native or 
naturalized,” as “large sections of German-Americans and Italian-Americans are in active 
sympathy with the governments and policies of their homeland.”177  
 To accomplish these goals, Loewenstein proposes the speedy adoption of a Federal 
Public Order Act, with provisions that would include increasing the penalty for sedition, 
dissolving anti-democratic organizations, prohibiting the militarization of political groups, 
limiting speech intended to support fascism, and the close supervision of press organs that 
express sympathy with fascist ideology.178 If such a law is not quickly implemented, the ability 
of the United States to defend itself will be impacted, and fascists and fascist sympathizers will 
have free reign to disrupt public opinion.179 
                                                
174 Loewenstein, “Federal Order Act.” 
  
175  Loewenstein, “Federal Order Act.” 
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177  Loewenstein, “Federal Order Act.” 
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 “A Federal Order” is an important speech, and is, up to this point, the clearest public 
reference to his academic works, as the Federal Order he proposes is virtually identical to the 
different types of laws he identified in “Military Democracy I and II” and “Legislative Control I 
and II.” There is something especially fascinating about Loewenstein, a German Jewish émigré 
himself, warning his audience about the threat posed by other German immigrants. By this point 
he clearly sees himself as distinct from his fellow émigrés. He shares in the America democratic 
tradition – “our national institution” – and, through advocating for militant democracy, is part of 
a group protecting American interests from national and international threats. This 
exceptionalism will appear again in later public statements. 
Significantly, Loewenstein’s proposals here fall into only the first category of militant 
democracy. In his proposed law there is no mention of a permanent reorganization of the United 
States’ legislative body, or any alteration of the role or powers of the President. Clearly, 
Loewenstein is only proposing the portions of his theory that could conceivably find the widest 
acceptance – it is difficult to imagine an audience of lawyers applauding a proposed fundamental 
change to the structure of democracy and power in the United States. The fact that Loewenstein 
chose not to include the most radical part of his theory, despite his clear belief in its necessity 
and effectiveness, shows the urgency with which he believes the fascist threat must be contained. 
At this point, whatever legislation can be passed, regardless of how effective it might be in the 
long-term, is necessary. 
 Further, throughout the speech Loewenstein’s anxiety is clear. He states, in no uncertain 
terms, and without providing any evidence, that there exists a large army of fascist sympathizers 
waiting in the wings to attack America. Composed of more than aliens, this army contains 
naturalized and even native-born citizens, and, if not immediately contained, will infiltrate and 
destabilize the nation. Loewenstein sees his Federal Order Act not as simply another important 
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legislation, but rather as essential, and inextricably tied to national defense. While by 1940 
Loewenstein was not alone in his fear of a fascist presence in America, or even in the belief that 
this presence extended to naturalized American citizens, the fervency with which he advocated 
for antifascist legislation is significant.180 
 “A Federal Order” marks a clear transition point for Loewenstein, and in this speech his 
advocacy reaches its zenith. Here, in contrast to his earlier statements, he explains both the threat 
posed to the United States, and how, through militant democracy, this threat can be contained. 
To Lowenstein, such laws are vital to American interests, and are absolutely necessary to defend 
the United States from fascist infiltration. 
** 
 
Loewenstein followed up on his words to the Bar Association with another speech, 
delivered on October 8, 1940 at Amherst College in Massachusetts. Loewenstein, along with 
Lawrence B. Packard,181 a Professor of History at Amherst, spoke to a gathering of students and 
                                                
180  The most recent examination of the development of the aforementioned Fifth Column myth, as well as 
fears among Americans about German spies, can be found in Richard Breitman and Allen Lichtman’s work FDR 
and the Jews. Once Germany invaded Poland, Roosevelt tasked the FBI to investigate German activities on 
American soil, vowing that America would not be hindered by sabotage as they had during the years leading up to 
World War I. After France had fallen, these fears mounted, with many believing that France’s defeat was ushered in 
by Nazi loyalists operating behind French lines. A Roper Pole in June 1940 found that only 2.7% of the population 
believed that the government was doing enough to stop a Fifth Column from operating in the United States. A 
suspicion of immigrants, particularly Jewish immigrants, developed hand-in-hand with this fear, and Breitman and 
Lichtman believe that it was partially responsible for the failure of the American government to do more to help 
Jewish refugees escape from Nazi Germany. Despite popular perception, there is little evidence of a Fifth Column 
actually existing. It is also essential to note that Loewenstein’s anxiety about fascism predates the fall of France, and 
his particular suspicion of American citizens, not just German nationals, was not entirely shared by the American 
government. Still, it is important that Loewenstein’s claims in this speech were not entirely without merit, although, 
regardless, the importance in his words here lies in the fact that they serve as another example of his public 
advocacy, as well as a window into his anxiety and pessimism, not their historical accuracy or validity. See 
Breitman and Lichtman, FDR and the Jews. See also Alistair Horne, To Lose a Battle: France 1940 (New York: 
Penguin Books, 2007) for more on France and the myth of the Fifth Column. 
 
181  While “America’s Eleventh Hour” was ostensibly written by both Packard and Loewenstein, it is difficult 
to see any influence Packard might have had on the speech and subsequent published pamphlet. Born in 1887, 
Packard worked at Amherst from 1925 – 1931, teaching French History. Before “America’s Eleventh Hour,” all of 
his publications came in that field, and his most well-known work examined the reign of Louis XIV. By 1940, 
Packard had retired, and had ceased publishing academic work. The content of “America’s Eleventh Hour” has 
obvious precursors in Loewenstein’s earlier work, as covered in Chapter One, and while at this point no document 
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fellow academics. The content of this speech was later published in a pamphlet titled “America’s 
Eleventh Hour.”182 This speech is another clear example of Loewenstein’s public advocacy. 
Similar to the Bar Association presentation a month earlier, he argues in favor of restrictive, 
antidemocratic legislation, for vigilance against the Fifth Column, and, for the first time, for 
direct military intervention in Europe to aid Britain in resisting Hitler’s onslaught. In terms of his 
advocacy, this speech is the fullest expression of both his theory of militant democracy, as well 
as the various means he employs in hopes of convincing the public of the importance and 
necessity of the application of such techniques in America. 
Packard and Loewenstein begin by stating in “unequivocal language” the necessity of 
America intervening militarily to aid Britain.183 America must, while there is still an opportunity, 
“give to Britain, the last democracy in Europe and our next-of-kin among nations, all the aid 
which we are able to render, without hesitation, restrictions, or limitations.”184 By 1940, events 
have progressed too far for America to stay out of the war, and if America wants to head off Nazi 
incursions into South America or the inevitable attack against the United States, Americans 
“must throw the full weight of our moral and material support behind Britain and the British 
Empire while there is yet a toe-hold in Britain from which to fight and hold off Nazi 
Germany.”185According to Packard and Loewenstein, this argument is not “war mongering, 
nor… hysteria. It is simply common sense. It is the belief that an ounce of prevention is worth a 
                                                                                                                                                       
explains the relationship between the two scholars, bearing these facts in mind it is reasonable to assume that 
Loewenstein was the driving force behind the speech, and its content can attributed to his evolving worldview.   
 
182  Loewenstein and Packard’s words were recorded and published in a pamphlet, also entitled “America’s 
Eleventh Hour.” The citations and quotations from their speech are drawn from this pamphlet. While the pamphlet 
was not widely circulated in 1940, it has been recently republished. See Karl Loewenstein and Laurence B. Packard, 
America’s Eleventh Hour (New York: Literary Licensing, LLC, 2013). 
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185  Loewenstein, “America’s Eleventh Hour,” 3. 
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pound of cure.”186 America “must defend America in Britain.187 Let us learn from the experience 
of Britain and France.”188 
Loewenstein’s argument and thought process here recalls his earlier explanation of the 
necessity for militant democracy. Throughout his academic publications, he presents militant 
democracy as a proactive solution to a problem that can be observed through close examination 
of the failures of the European democracies. Now, America, based on similar observations, must 
recognize the need to provide aid to Britain in order to head off a Nazi threat. If America fails to 
heed the warning provided by history, and allows Nazi Germany to defeat Britain, Hitler will 
assuredly turn next to South and North America, and the battle against fascism will have to be 
waged on American soil.  
In arguing such, Loewenstein is adding a new dimension to his theory of militant 
democracy. Implicit in his advocacy for direct military and material intervention on the part of 
Britain is the understanding that preventive antifascist legislation can only go so far. Fascism has 
reached a point where force of arms is required to defeat it, and simply hoping – as 
Czechoslovakia and other European nations had earlier – that democratic ideals or even militant 
democracy will suffice to guarantee the future of democracy is foolish. This argument, in turn, 
further demonstrates the alarm with which Loewenstein views the spread of fascism. To him, and 
as he states throughout this speech, the stakes for America have never been higher. America is on 
the brink. 
After arguing for the necessity for military intervention in Europe, Loewenstein and 
Packard describe the threat facing America. The United States is part of “a deadly struggle 
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 66 
 
between two opposite ways of life, between two political principles which – as experience has 
taught us – cannot live peaceably side by side in this world.”189 This struggle is “a war of the 
Will to Power against our faith and religion, against tolerance and humanitarian values, against 
our national traditions and cherished ways of life.”190 Reference to Nietzsche notwithstanding, 
this description is particularly important, and shows Loewenstein’s continuing attempt to use any 
effective argument, regardless of its accuracy, in order to convince the public of the importance 
of his statements. Before this speech, Loewenstein has, at every opportunity, argued against an 
idealistic view of democracy, believing that, when confronted by the new reality of political life 
in the 1930s and 1940s, cherished ways of life and national traditions are irrelevant, and only the 
reality of the political scene matters. Yet, here, Loewenstein is using these very same arguments 
to convince his audience of the severity of the threat facing America. The same beliefs that he 
labored to discredit are now shown as the qualities that will be threatened by fascism.  
This threat will appear on several fronts. Germany, after defeating England, “will be 
ready instantly for the attack on the United States.”191 Hitler’s assault will either take the form of 
an economic attack, by working to isolate the United States and deprive the nation of resources, 
or through a direct military attack. Loewenstein believes that Hitler hopes to destabilize America 
to the point where the despairing citizenry will embrace fascism, and flock to a growing 
American fascist movement. If this movement comes into existence, it would mean that 
the under-privileged, those whom we call the dregs of society, the unsuccessful, the frustrated, the 
lunatic fringe, will eagerly seize the opportunity of gaining ascendancy. It will mean that the  
foreign nationalities in this country, the Germans, Italians, and other races, stimulated from their 
homelands under the Nazi whip, will try to oust their traditional control of the Anglo-Saxons. It 
means that the freaks and the ranks, the white trash, will rule your town council, your state 
government, and control the Federal authorities. We are headed for a civil war much more 
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devastating than the War Between the States unless we do our part in stemming the totalitarian 
tide now.192  
 
This passage, again, shows Loewenstein’s newfound adaptability. He is presenting the conflict 
between fascism and democracy as not simply a war between nations, but as a clash between the 
traditional American way of life and a destabilizing force that seeks to destroy all of the 
institutions of the United States. Fascism is the ideology of the white trash, of the lower classes, 
and if Hitler is not defeated in Europe, and America does not intervene on the part of England, 
than the United States is headed for a civil war. 
 Further, there is something especially ironic about a Jewish German émigré speaking 
about Anglo-Saxon tradition. Just as in “A Federal Order Act,” Loewenstein, despite his 
heritage, is including himself as part of the ruling Anglo-Saxon class structure. While this 
inclusion may be partly explained by his affinity for England, as seen in his biography, it is more 
than likely simply another example of his willingness to use any argument possible to convince 
the public of the necessity of adopting militant democracy to fight off fascism. By late 1940, 
Loewenstein’s advocacy has progressed to the point where he is willing to do anything to further 
his cause. He has become a true soldier for democracy, fighting with the fervency of a zealot to 
protect the system he holds in such high regard. This sentiment stands in stark contrast to his 
earlier academic writings, especially “Autocracy vs Democracy,” where he takes considerable 
time to explain that the conflict between fascism and democracy may simply be part of the 
forward progress of changing political ideas, with democracy joining the ranks of other 
discredited belief systems.  
 Key to the fascist threat facing America is the existence of a large Fifth Column, hidden 
among the public. Today “the enemy is in our midst,” as “there are allies of the enemy in this 
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country, organized, ready to organize, and as yet unorganized. We call them the Fifth Column, 
but we do not take them seriously enough.”193 This group is “[f]ound among our fellow 
citizens… there are countless spies in this country, in our tool and armament factories, in our 
airplane plants; they may even be in our National Guard.”194 Just as dangerous as the outright 
collaborators are those who are unwittingly part of the Fifth Column, the “isolationists, the anti-
British, the socialists dreaming of the socialist millennium, the compromisers, the appeasers, the 
ostriches.”195  
 According to Loewenstein, the crux of the problem is not in identifying disloyal and 
dangerous citizens, but rather that there are “no laws to deal with them; they are free to speak 
and to act under our democratic tenets.”196 This argument is the core of militant democracy, and 
is one of the clearest, and most articulate examples, of its expression. Here is the heart of his 
advocacy: America is rife with traitors, yet we can do nothing to stop them. The solution – the 
passage of laws allowing the Fifth Column to eliminated – is obvious. 
 Unfortunately, despite the apparent obviousness of this need, much of America labors 
under what Packard and Loewenstein term “Our Dangerous Illusions,” which prevent the 
necessary steps to protect America from being taken.197 While most of the public operate under 
the illusion that democracy is the status quo, in reality “democracy is something for the 
attainment of preservation of which human beings have to strain every muscle.”198 Up to this 
point, America’s democracy has been “gained by force, and it cannot be retained without 
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continuous vigilance and even, if need to be, without fighting for it.”199 Fascism cannot prosper 
without the destruction of “[f]ree and contented peoples living under rulers of their own 
choice.”200 As Loewenstein eloquently summarizes,  
 democracy, therefore, lest it remain a hollow shell, must be something for which we are willing to 
 fight, and if need be, to die. Democracy is not only rights, as much more so, duties for those who 
 do more than pay lip-service to an empty slogan.201 
 
Here, again, Loewenstein makes the stakes as clear as possible to his audience. Failing to 
actively resist fascism is akin to working towards the destruction of the United States, as 
“[whoever] preaches isolation is either blind or one who works, consciously or unconsciously, 
for the totalitarian powers.”202  
The hysterical bent to his words is obviously apparent. Loewenstein envisions a secret 
force of citizens and non-citizens waiting in the wings to organize and aid Hitler in destroying 
America. Even those in favor of neutrality can be considered part of this enemy group: to him, 
you are either with him, with the Anglo-Saxon system, or a fascist sympathizer. There is no 
middle ground. Even Loewenstein’s description of Nazis, as revolutionary fanatics “of a nation 
deliberately stripped of all moral inhibitions and humanitarian impulses” borders on the hysteric, 
especially when spoken by a trained academic.203 As he describes them, National Socialists are 
akin to dangerous monsters bereft of human emotion, hell-bent on destroying America and 
democracy at all costs. To Loewenstein, there are no divisions within Nazi Germany, and the 
Germans that have joined the Nazi party have committed themselves to conquest.   
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Fortunately, America can profit from the “blindness, weakness, self-deceit, and 
complacency” of the defeated European nations.204 American citizens must “learn by the lessons 
taught to the world,” namely the consequences of failing earlier to restrain Hitler’s past 
aggressions, and defend Britain.205 In fact, America is already part of this defense, as there is no 
compromise possible with Hitler, and the United States must prepare itself for the coming war.206  
Key to this preparation, and in line with all of Loewenstein’s academic work, is the 
implementation of temporary restrictions on the democratic process, as proscribed by militant 
democracy. America  
must suspend democracy temporarily in order to save it permanently.207 Do not heed the clamor 
of our incurable liberals, who bemoan a spot on the wallpaper while the roof over their heads is  
aflame. It may well be that the emergency measures we have to take in wartimes – and we are  
already living under war conditions – will bring hardships and even injustice to individuals. But 
we cannot grant freedom of speech or of political organization to those who use them only for the 
ultimate destruction of democracy. Exaggerated liberalism benefits only the Fifth Column.208  
 
While these limitations are in large part identical to those described at the Bar Association 
speech, including restrictions on speech, political parties, the monitoring of foreign-born citizens, 
suspension of the right to organize, for the first time Loewenstein comments on the electoral 
process. To him, the current energy and attention devoted to the upcoming 1940 presidential 
election, with Roosevelt preparing to run for a third term, is an unnecessary diversion. 
Americans should “remember that petty party politics and the jealousies of party politicians and 
eroded France and England.”209 Instead, American citizens should recognize that there is little 
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practical difference between Roosevelt and his opponent, and spend their energies preparing for 
the impending conflict with Hitler, as whatever changes are implemented by whoever wins the 
election will pale in comparison to the destruction Hitler will unleash on the America way of life 
if left unchecked.210 
 This section is the first, and only, comment in any of Loewenstein’s public discourse that 
alludes to the permanent aspects of his theory of militant democracy, the proposed reorganization 
of the American legislative and executive branches. While Loewenstein is clearly not advocating 
for the extensive changes he proposes in “The Balance Between Legislative and Executive 
Power,” he is, in the same spirit, criticizing the existing American electoral process. To him, 
party conflicts help promote the “internal disunity [that] is the soil on which fascism thrives.”211 
 While the rest of “America’s Eleventh Hour” is devoted to outlining the aforementioned  
types of restrictive antifascist legislation, and is not substantially different from the Bar 
Association speech or even Loewenstein’s academic works, Loewenstein’s comments on the role 
of youth in America, and his concluding personal appeal to his readers to act as watchdogs for 
democracy, are worthy of special attention. To Loewenstein, America has “given too much 
weight to the opinions of our young people. Politics is a matter of the adult, the experience, for 
the older generation.”212 While the youth are important, they should not be allowed to participate 
“in the decision of our national destinies which their blind idealisms seem entitled to demand.” 
Here, once again, Loewenstein’s dislike of idealism, his emphasis on realism, and his pessimistic 
worldview, shine clear. In his eyes the youth are incapable of appropriately responding to the 
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crisis at hand, and must be deprived, just like fascists (although for different reasons), of the 
ability to participate in the democratic process. 
 Also noteworthy is that, for the first time, Loewenstein directly appeals to the public to 
participate in the effort to identify the Fifth Column. As part of his concluding comments, he 
extolls his listeners to act 
 if you believe… that you have discovered an activity detrimental to American interests  
 and national defense, communicate your observations, under your name, to the federal authorities. 
 Don’t take the law into your own hands, and don’t embitter our social relations by unwarranted  
 suspicions.213 
 
To Loewenstein, the threat posed by fascism is so severe that all citizens must participate in a 
policing process to root out the Fifth Column. This argument is yet another manifestation of 
Loewenstein’s anxiety about the fascist threat facing the United States. 
 “America’s Eleventh Hour” is perhaps the best, and most thoroughly reasoned, example 
of Loewenstein’s public advocacy, and shows an academic starkly different from the one 
presented in most articles or monographs concerning militant democracy. In virtually every 
statement Loewenstein describes the threat facing the United States as dire, and argues that the 
only chance America has to resist Hitler is to quickly adopt laws in line with his theory of 
militant democracy  
** 
 
 Loewenstein’s advocacy for militant democracy relented from 1941 until 1944, 
especially after America joined the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor. During this period 
Loewenstein taught at Amherst and consulted part-time with the State Department on matters 
related to South America, another area of academic interest.214 His advocacy would reemerge in 
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1944, as the Allies found greater success on the battlefield, and the defeat of Nazi Germany 
became more likely.   
On August 26, 1944 The Nation published an editorial written by Loewenstein, titled 
“The Trojan Horse,” in which he argues for harsh political restrictions on conquered Axis 
nations, lest fascism reemerge and continue to menace democracy.215 By late 1944, Allied 
victory in Europe was almost assured. America, British and Canadian forces had successfully 
landed at Normandy, and were progressively pushing the Wehrmacht back towards Germany’s 
borders. A week earlier leading elements of the Allied had entered Paris, and a day before the 
article’s publication the Germany garrison occupying the city officially surrendered. By any 
standard, the sun had set on Hitler’s ambitions, and, beset by American, British and Canadian 
forces in France, and Russian forces on the Eastern Front, the German stranglehold on Europe 
had been broken.  
 Yet, despite these positive developments – Hitler, the architect of Loewenstein’s 
immigration to America, and the standard bearer for the political ideology that he worked so hard 
                                                                                                                                                       
1942, 91-100; and a book, Karl Loewenstein, Brazil Under Vargas (New York: Macmillan Company, 1942). For a 
summary of Loewenstein’s entire bibliography, see Lang’s biography as well as Henry Steele Conmager, ed., 
Festschrift fur Fritz Karl Loewenstein (Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 1976). Loewenstein was especially interested in 
Brazil, and the ways in which the unique Brazilian system conformed with traditional western notions of democracy.  
 
215  Loewenstein expanded this argument into a book, Political Reconstruction, written in 1945 before he began 
his service with the Military Government and published in 1946. Here, in a “long manuscript that theorized the 
political, legal, and moral reconstruction of a fascist society,” just as in “The Trojan Horse,” article, Loewenstein 
discusses the necessity of ignoring traditional concerns with sovereignty during the occupation, as if left alone, 
Germany would return to fascism. While the work is a further indication of his suspicion, as it was published after 
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different from articles and works already discussed, Political Reconstruction will not be examined in detail. For an 
examination of Loewenstein’s role in the political reconstruction of Germany and Political Reconstruction, see R. 
W. Kostal, “The Alchemy of Occupation: Karl Loewenstein and the Legal Reconstruction of Nazi Germany, 1945-
1946,” Law and History Review 29 (2011): 14-15. Importantly, in this article Kostal never mentions “The Trojan 
Horse,” instead relying on Loewenstein’s personal diaries and correspondence from his time in Germany. See also 
Karl Loewenstein, Political Reconstruction (New York: Macmillan, 1946). Within Political Reconstruction, 
Loewenstein only mentions ‘militant democracy’ specifically once, commenting that the situation of the previous 
years had made the idea of militant democracy “less obnoxious than it would have seemed.” Loewenstein, Political 
Reconstruction, 129. Despite the dearth of references to the topic at hand, Political Reconstruction is an important 
work that scholars other than Kostal have neglected.  
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to combat, had failed in his quest to subjugate Europe – Loewenstein remains anxious about 
fascism. His editorial discusses the impending political reorganization of a subjugated Germany, 
arguing against the concept of political self-determination, or allowing German citizens to 
decide, without external input, on the form a new government would take.216 Instead, 
Loewenstein believes that 
 there is no absolute right of internal self-determination, and consequently, that the victorious  
 states must be prepared to claim, and must be permitted to exercise, the right of intervention in  
 the internal affairs of any state which “chooses” a “form of government” constituting by its nature 
 and potential development a threat to their own security and to universal peace.217 
 
Loewenstein recognizes that this argument runs counter to the traditional notions of sovereignty, 
as “for more than a century no responsible authority has dared to challenge the equality, 
sovereignty, and independence of states as the premises of the law of nations.”218 But, faced with 
the possibility of a liberated Germany turning again to a fascist or autocratic government, this 
independence cannot be granted.  
To Loewenstein, the past decade has shown the folly of such freedom. “Hecatombs of 
innocent victims have been sacrificed because the despots were permitted, under protection of 
the dogma of internal self-determination, to extinguish the freedom of their own people.”219 To 
prevent such a catastrophe from occurring in the future, and to guarantee that no new autocratic 
system emerges, as these systems are “diametrically opposed” to democracy, Loewenstein 
believes that the defeated Axis nations must be forced to follow a number of rules.220 While 
these rules fall short of forcing these nations to adopt a democratic form of government, they act 
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to allow democracy “to grow from within by popular acceptance,” thereby accomplishing the 
same effect.221 
First, after their defeat, each Axis nation should convene a constitutional convention 
overseen by the Allies in which a democratic constitution should be drafted and create plans for 
future free elections.222 Second, once these elections are convened, they should be 
 held under the control of the United Nations, or of an international police if by that time it has  
 been created. Certain categories of discredited people, such as Nazi officials, prominent  
 sympathizers, notorious turncoats, collaborationists, and so on, are to be excluded from eligibility 
 by law. Nor are parties with anti-democratic platforms, leaders, or techniques permissible.223  
 
Third, at every step of this process, the Allied governments should have the ability to veto 
constitutional provisions that they view as “a danger to the operation of a democratic form of 
government” in order to protect their own interests.224 Fourth, the proposed constitutions must 
contain an extensive Bill of Rights, with special emphasis on the ability of citizens to freely 
participate in government.225 Fifth, and finally, once these steps have been met, and a sitting 
government is elected that is clearly pro-democracy, the Allied governments may step back, and 
allow the state to enjoy self-determination.226 If these steps are not taken, then America will 
again be threatened by an autocratic government risen from the ashes of Nazism. Germany and 
the other Axis nations, through their actions and choice of governments, have abrogated their 
right to self-determination, and only though an obvious commitment to democracy can this right 
be earned back.  
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 Loewenstein’s words here show the continuing evolution of his understanding of what 
militant democracy means. While the steps he proposes Allied nations should force upon the 
defeated Axis states are similar in both content and approach to the provisions of militant 
democracy as outlined in “Militant Democracy I and II,” the restrictions on the rights of fascists 
included here are seemingly permanent, and not temporary in nature. Loewenstein gives no 
indication that Nazis or anti-democratic citizens, despite his apparent belief in the importance of 
free participation of all citizens in the democratic process, will ever be allowed to vote or hold 
office. This distinction shows his evolving theory of militant democracy, as well as the anxiety 
with which he regards the soon to be defeated Axis nations. Even though fascism has clearly 
failed, and through this failure become discredited, Loewenstein cannot help but envision a new 
autocratic system arising and again threatening democracy. While he argues that the Allies 
should not implement democracy from above, instead letting it arise organically from within, his 
proposal leaves virtually no option for the defeated nations to pursue an alternative form of 
government. Clearly by this point he believes that democracy is the only acceptable form of 
government, and for democracy to prosper autocracy must be stamped out. The two competing 
ideologies cannot peacefully coexist. This argument stands in stark contrast to his earlier, 
academic writings, in particular “Autocracy versus Democracy.”  
Once again, this level of nuance is missing from most scholars’ description of militant 
democracy. If, for example, militant democracy, as understood in Loewenstein by 1944, was 
applied to the War on Terror – a popular topic among scholars referencing his work – it would 
seemingly suggest that the United States should destroy all existing autocratic systems, as these 
systems, when viewed in the context of Loewenstein’s work, cannot be allowed to coexist with 
democracy. The fact this argument has failed to appear in any secondary sources only further 
shows the cursory and insufficient way most scholars have used Loewenstein to this point. “The 
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Trojan Horse” again shows the complexity of militant democracy as envisioned by Loewenstein, 
his continual public advocacy for the adoption of these techniques, and how this appeal and 
theoretical progression are rooted in his ever-present anxiety about fascism.   
** 
 
 Loewenstein would continue to operate under this anxiety even after the end of World 
War II and the final defeat of the Axis. Shortly after the end of the war Loewenstein, while 
working with the Legal Division of the United States Office of Military Government for 
Germany as part of a team experts brought in to aid in the denazification process, wrote a letter 
to the editors of The New York Times, published on June 15, 1945, criticizing the growing 
demand to allow fraternization between Allied soldiers and German citizens.  
 According to Loewenstein, “all reports agree that the Germans are unrepentant, unshaken 
and impervious to self-introspection,” and it would be unwise to “expose our GI’s to the as yet 
undiluted poison of twelve years of Nazi indoctrination.”227 American soldiers would be 
especially susceptible to this indoctrination when coming from “the lips of an attractive female,” 
and, despite their best efforts, would be unable to distinguish between good Germans and 
Nazis.228 To Loewenstein, the argument against non-fraternization is akin to Hitler’s attack 
against the Treaty of Versailles, and it would be folly to “ourselves start [the Nazis] charitably on 
the road” towards abrogating their recently signed unconditional surrender.229 
 Loewenstein’s argument here is clearly tinged with anxiety. He makes no distinction 
between members of the Nazi party and the average German citizen, instead presenting Germany 
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by and large, with the exception of a few unnamed and undefined good Germans, as a unified 
entity populated by rabid, ideological Nazis who are waiting for any opportunity to spread their 
vile doctrine to innocent American soldiers. At this point, after the final defeat of Germany, 
Loewenstein still cannot escape his fear of the threat posed by fascism. Barely a month after the 
utter destruction of the Nazi government and the Wehrmacht, Loewenstein cannot help but 
envision another war between fascist Germany and the Western democracies. While in this letter 
to the editor Loewenstein never explicitly alludes to his theory of militant democracy or its 
techniques, his writing here is the product of that same thought process. The same logic that led 
him to earlier argue for the application of strict antifascist legislation, is now leading him to view 
every German as a potential Nazi propaganda agent, waiting for their chance to convert an 
unsuspecting American soldier. The fact that this thinking is still evident, even after the defeat of 
Germany, shows how thoroughly Loewenstein has been consumed by his anxiety, and how 
deeply he has become invested in the war against fascism.  
This anxiety and suspicion continues to appear in Loewenstein’s writing into 1946. In 
another letter to the editors of The New York Times, of December 8, he criticizes the America 
denazification process, arguing that it, to this point, had been inadequate, and that Germany was 
still rife with Nazis.230 Written shortly after leaving his position with the Legal Division and 
returning to Amherst College, Loewenstein begins by explaining the importance of 
denazification in the postwar process, as on it, and demilitarization, hinges the entirety of 
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German reconstruction.231 Unfortunately, despite the importance of this process, to date the 
American Military Government has done an exceptionally poor job rooting out and punishing 
Nazis. While the task of discovering Nazis is difficult, especially due to a reluctance by the 
military to “oust technically competent men because of party membership,” the entire 
denazification process, which relies on small denazification boards to judge and mete out 
punishment, is flawed.232 To date, the German people have recognized that these boards are 
overtaxed and ill-suited to judging the nuance of Nazi political life, and willingly present 
themselves, despite their work for Hitler, as fellow victims of Nazism in order to effectively 
escape punishment.233 Unsurprisingly, this strategy, along with an eagerness of American 
officials to quickly race through the process, has led to a situation in which “punishments, as a 
rule, are light” and hardly any “Nazi gangster [has been tried] on the basis of German common 
law.”234 
 Loewenstein believes the solution to this crisis is to reformat the denazification 
procedure. Key to this reformatting is an understanding of the character of the German people, 
who are “impervious to moral scruples, if not wholly unregenerate. They realize in the midst of 
their misery that they have lost the war. But they do not regret having been Nazis.”235 Bearing 
this in mind, instead of attempting to judge every member of the Nazi party, experts should be 
brought in to draw a strong line “between [the] small fry and socially prominent and 
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professionally important former Nazis.”236 Once identified, these Nazis should be harshly 
punished through the German court system and by German common law, and “professions which 
are instrumental in the formation of public opinion should be thoroughly and ruthlessly purged 
from even nominal Nazis.”237 
 Again, Loewenstein is presenting the German populace as an amoral entity, although he 
is by this point drawing a distinction between the most outrageous of Nazi criminals and the 
average party member who joined after Hitler’s rise to power. While Loewenstein never 
describes the consequences of failing to implement his proposed new denazification procedures, 
when read in the context of his academic writing, and when compared to other examples of his 
public writing, it becomes clear that he fears a reemergence of fascist Germany. Similarly, while 
he never references militant democracy, his argument for the permanent removal of any Nazis 
from positions in which they might have the ability to influence the public reads very similarly to 
his argument for the implementation of strict antifascist legislation to deprive fascists of 
propaganda tools before the War. Just as in “The Trojan Horse,” here Loewenstein gives no hint 
that his proposed restriction on the careers of former Nazis will be temporary. Instead, these 
former Nazis will be permanently barred from these professions. Underlying this entire letter is 
Loewenstein’s continuing anxiety. Even though over a year has passed since the German 
surrender, Loewenstein still fears fascism, and still believes it is his duty to convince the public 
of the necessity of a hard anti-fascist stance.  
 Unlike his earlier letter to The New York Times, Loewenstein’s comments on the 
denazification process proved controversial, and solicited a response from Fritz Oppenheimer, a 
former Captain with General Dwight D. Eisenhower and later member of the team tasked with 
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reorganizing the German judicial system, published on January 12, 1947. Oppenheimer 
dismisses Loewenstein’s criticisms as unjustified, calling him a “nihilist,” and derides his 
proposed solution as unworkable.238 He argues that the German people are willing to atone for 
their crimes, and that “hooligans that have committed specific crimes under the Hitler regime are 
being treated as ordinary criminals, in accordance with principles of justice.”239 To date, the 
Military Government has investigated over 1,800,000 cases of Nazism, and is implementing a 
long range strategy to call all of those over 18 years of age to account for whatever crimes they 
have committed under Hitler’s rule.240 While Oppenheimer acknowledges that the task of 
denazification is complex and to date has not been completed, he believes that “we are far 
advanced on the road towards complete destruction of Nazism.”241 
 Loewenstein responded to Oppenheimer’s letter on January 16, 1947, and although this 
response was not published by The New York Times, it is yet another example of Loewenstein’s 
continued pessimism and anxiety. Loewenstein dismisses Oppenheimer’s response, claiming, 
“his rejoined seems to fall short of its objective in that it lacks elucidation as to how the 
[denazification procedures] stood the test in practice.”242 According to Loewenstein, the Military 
Government’s own figures, which show that 92% of cases before the denazification boards 
“were declared not chargeable at all,” and recent scandals in the Bavarian government in which 
top officials were found to have been prominent Nazis, show the continued failure of the existing 
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denazification procedures. Loewenstein also takes issue with the tone of Oppenheimer’s reply, 
writing that  
 it is hardly an edifying experience that a citizen who in a free country brings his anxiety about  
 what Dr. Oppenheimer rightly calls “the crucial test of Germany”, to the forum of public  
 discussion, runs the risk of being accused, by a government official, of “nihilism”, a term  
 obviously denoting disagreement with government policies.”243 
 
 This letter is another entry in Loewenstein’s long list of public appeals on the subject of 
fighting fascism. Although unpublished, Loewenstein’s tone here, several years after the defeat 
of Nazism, is as anxious as in his writing during the height of Hitler’s triumph in Europe. Once 
again, Loewenstein’s thinking is driven by his anxiety about fascism, and his belief that the 
existence of any fascist government poses a dire threat to the continued prosperity of democracy 
and America. 
** 
 
 Throughout the late 1930s and 1940s Loewenstein engaged in an extensive campaign of 
public advocacy for the adoption of militant democracy and antifascist legislation, and, after the 
end of the war, continued vigilance towards purging the Nazi threat in order to guarantee that 
America would never again face a fascist Germany. During this advocacy, Loewenstein’s theory 
of militant democracy continued to evolve, until, by 1944, he was arguing for permanent 
measures to deprive fascists from participating in the electoral process, and, by 1946, measures 
to prevent fascists from even holding jobs in fields deemed important.  
 Further, throughout his writing and his public speeches, Loewenstein shows the anxiety 
with which he regards the fascist threat. During the war he believed in the existence of an 
extensive and unknown Fifth Column of fascist loyalists, composed of America-born citizens, 
naturalized citizens and resident aliens, waiting for an opportunity to leap into action and aid 
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Hitler in destroying America. Even after the war, Loewenstein feared the influence of Nazis on 
American soldiers, believing that the German citizens were entirely unrepentant for their crimes, 
and, if not properly monitored, would again menace democracy. This anxiety at times caused 
Loewenstein to verge on the hysteric, and forced him, when advocating in public, to pursue any 
strategy he could to argue in favor for the speedy adoption of his ideas, including, despite his 
ethnic heritage and nationality, presenting himself as a defender of the traditional Christian and 
Anglo-Saxon American worldview. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Brothers-in-Thought: 
John Herz, Karl Lowenstein and the Pessimistic Worldview 
 
 
 
 
“I saw my challenge in enlightening the world 
about the true character of Nazism.”244 
 
 
 
 Karl Loewenstein was by no means the only émigré intellectual struggling to understand 
the new political reality of life post-immigration. John Herz’s forced immigration also left him 
sharply pessimistic, and his work during the years leading up to World War II and its immediate 
aftermath shows a scholar struggling to reconcile the clash between fascism and democracy. He, 
too, sought to discover the way in which the surviving democratic systems could successfully 
navigate through an increasingly chaotic and troubled world. Unsurprisingly, Herz also worked 
with the American government during the war, and, after leaving government service, was 
sharply critical of denazification and the actions of the Military Government in postwar 
Germany. 
Yet, despite their similar biographies and worldview, Herz arrived at a markedly different 
solution to the democratic dilemma than Loewenstein, foregoing the idea of militant democracy 
in favor of a nuanced outlook predicated on abandoning both idealism and realism for a 
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measured and sophisticated combination of both he termed Liberal Realism. Consequently, 
Herz’s work, despite its pessimism, lacks much of the sharpness and anxiety so evident in 
Loewenstein’s thought, and functions as a counterpoint that demonstrates the uniqueness of 
Loewenstein’s theory of militant democracy, as well as an example of the way in which other 
émigré thinkers were able to understand the new world in which they found themselves. Where 
Loewenstein saw nothing but continual anxiety, Herz saw an escape from pessimism, and was 
able to conceive of a world with a functioning, peaceful international system which incorporated 
both democracies and non-democratic governments.245  
** 
 
Herz, like Loewenstein and hundreds of other intellectuals, was forced to flee Germany 
in 1933 after being dismissed from his job as a law clerk because of his Jewish heritage.246 He 
left Germany for Geneva, Switzerland, where he resumed his studies at the Geneva Graduate 
Institute of International Studies under Hans Kelsen.247 Herz had previously worked with Kelsen 
from 1927 to 1931 at the University of Cologne, where he was schooled in Kelsen’s Pure Theory 
of Law, which “tried to liberate legal theory from all religious, scientific, ethical, sociological 
and political elements.”248 Kelsen argued that “the legislator was not bound by fundamental 
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moral values or ethical principles,” and that “every law passed in accordance with set procedures 
was binding and needed no further justification,” regardless of its content.249  
While in Geneva, Herz, troubled by the spread of fascism across Europe and the failure 
of the League of Nations to prevent Italy from invading Ethiopia, began to move away from 
Kelsen’s Pure Law,250 eventually coming to believe that analyzing international law in a vacuum 
“in the Kelsian sense appeared increasingly absurd.”251 During this period he began to develop 
the particular theory combining realism and idealism that would underpin his work for the next 
several decades. For him, the question of the modern age was to define the way in which 
international relations functioned, and how “international law, apparently a system of practical, 
enforceable norms binding upon nation-states, can be conceived as a normative, functioning 
system.”252 In Herz’s eyes, Kelsen’s positivistic system failed to account for the fact that 
“international relations were essentially still anarchical in nature,” as well as to explain the 
reality of how, during this time, the European nations confronted each other.253  
For Herz, the experience of being removed from his job due to his ethnic heritage and 
being forced to leave Germany was traumatic, and fundamentally altered his worldview, 
infecting him with a pessimism that would define much of his later academic output, especially 
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during the period surrounding World War II. In his biography, he links the trauma of this 
experience to his evolving understanding of international relations (and growing distance from 
Kelsen), as well as clearly describes the overwhelming emotional impact of his forced 
immigration. For Herz, the flight to Geneva 
meant shifting from the area of the normative (law) to that of facts and events, the brutal realm of 
politics. And brutal they were. [The Nazis] had destroyed my idea of a planned, orderly life and 
career in an ordered, minimally decent, reformable environment. Now the chasms of the 20th  
century were revealed: the abyss of racism that was to end in the holocaust; already foreshadowed 
in the blood-fillled trenches of World War I; absolutely brutal rulership, as prophesied by Jacob 
Burckhardt. All of this destroyed remnants of still existing rationalistic belief in “inevitable  
progress.” The world became a theater of the absurd, and I became more and more pessimistic. 
Suicide might have been the logical consequence. I weighed the idea from time and time, but  
youthful energy prevented me from taking the final step. Shifting my attention to the realm of 
world politics, I found that complete resignation was not a propos. If not from within, fascism  
might, perhaps, still be destroyed from without. Thus, to my theoretical interests in analyzing 
situations there was added a very practical interest in action: What could be done to promote such 
an objective?254 
 
Beyond showing the development of Herz’s pessimism – a worldview shared with Loewenstein 
– this description also provides insight into Loewenstein’s character. While Loewenstein’s 
immigration to the United States was not as fraught with uncertainty as Herz’s, as he was both 
older and more easily able to secure a teaching position, the experience of being forced, 
overnight, to abandon the country in which he had spent his entire working life was no doubt 
horrifying, and had lasting effects on his worldview. Unfortunately, for Herz, despite his 
attempts at navigating the new world order he found himself a part of, after five years in 
Switzerland “resignation and even pessimism and a feeling of depression [had] set in,” and he 
decided to immigrate to the United States.255 To Herz, this journey was perilous, and he believed 
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that “the darkness of my fate seemed tied to the dark fate threatening Europe… my going away 
appeared to me as a taking leave from a continent doomed to die.”256 
After immigrating to the United States in 1938, Herz was accepted into the Institute for 
Advanced Study at Princeton University, where he worked from 1939 to 1941 under Edward M. 
Earle.257 While there, he was tasked with researching the historical British balance of power 
system, and concluded that “utopianism had too often produced peace plans built on the 
quicksands of wishful thinking and therefore highly likely to fail.”258 After leaving Princeton, 
Herz was hired at Howard University, and, following Pearl Harbor, joined the Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) in hopes of playing a more active role in the fight against Nazism.259 While in the 
OSS, he helped plan the reconstruction of defeated Germany, and, like Loewenstein, was 
involved with the preparation for the Nuremburg Trials. Following disagreements over 
denazification, he left government service in 1948, and resumed teaching at Howard until 1952, 
after which he accepted a position at the City College of New York, where he stayed until his 
retirement in 1979. Like Loewenstein, during this period Herz publicly criticized denazification. 
After leaving government service, and during his second stint teaching at Howard University, 
Herz published his best known work, Political Realism and Political Idealism. Therein, Herz 
attempts to solve the dilemma facing modern states and conceive of a new, functional 
international system. Despite the pessimism clearly evident in Political Realism and Political 
Idealism, Herz’s solution is starkly different from militant democracy and contains hope for a 
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peaceful future where nations, regardless of political belief, could coexist. This work best 
demonstrates the theoretical differences between the two scholars. 
** 
 
During this period, Herz first came into contact with Loewenstein. The earliest existing 
exchange between the two dates to January 11, 1940, although based on the content of this letter, 
it is clear that the two had been in communication earlier. Unfortunately copies of these earlier 
letters are not held in the archives of either scholar. Written from Loewenstein to Herz, this first 
correspondence is little more than formalities. Herz had originally contacted Loewenstein asking 
after a permanent position at Amherst – two years after immigrating he was still at Princeton and 
was encountering difficulty in securing a tenured placement – and while Loewenstein 
commiserates with Herz’s predicament, he’s unable to offer any help at this time, but will 
contact him if he hears of any positions opening.260 Although short, this letter is instructive in the 
burgeoning relationship between the two. Loewenstein clearly understands the difficult situation 
Herz has found himself in, and his willingness to aid Herz hints at the shared worldview between 
the two thinkers. Both have found themselves isolated in America after their forced immigration, 
and while Loewenstein has successfully found a placement by this point, both are part of an 
exclusive émigré community. 
 Herz wrote to Loewenstein again on September 26, 1944 along similar lines. At this point 
Herz is working with the OSS, on leave from his temporary position at Howard University, and 
is still on the lookout for a tenured faculty appointment as he sees the war drawing to a close in 
the near future.261 The main purpose behind Herz’s letter, beyond his job search, is to ask after a 
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proposed panel on which both he and Loewenstein would have sat.262 Herz feels the resurrection 
of this panel – the “Panel on Comparative Government” – would be especially timely, with the 
prospect of the reconstruction of “various European governments” and the “impending problems 
of post-Nazi German government” in the near future.263 Again, while short, this letter is further 
evidence of the growing academic relationship between the two scholars. Conceivably both are 
concerned with denazification and political reconstruction (a concern that will manifest in their 
academic work), and Herz regards Loewenstein highly enough to ask after a proposed panel.  
 Loewenstein responded to Herz on December 4, 1944. While he can offer no help in 
Herz’s job search, he reassures Herz that he has a “very high opinion of your work and I am very 
anxious to see you properly placed.”264 Loewenstein then concludes the letter on a telling, 
pessimistic note. While he believes that Herz’s opinion “that the War will be over soon... may be 
correct,” he cannot help but think otherwise, as “the Germans do not seem to be close to 
unconditional surrender as we might wish.”265 While brief, this comment is the first hint of 
Loewenstein’s pessimism within his correspondence with Herz. By mid-December 1944, and 
especially after the Battle of the Bulge, the defeat of Nazi Germany was almost entirely assured, 
with the recent liberation of France and the impending invasion of German territory by both 
Russian and German forces. Still, even faced with overwhelming evidence of the Allies’ 
progress, Loewenstein cannot help but express pessimism about the prospects of the war ending 
soon.  
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 This pessimism is much more apparent in the next exchange between the two scholars, 
which took place in early 1947. Herz had apparently written to Loewenstein to express 
agreement with Loewenstein’s letter to the editor critical of denazification published in The New 
York Times and to criticize Oppenheimer’s response in support of the existing denazification 
policies. Replying to Herz on January 18, 1947, Loewenstein first thanks Herz for his interest, 
and comments that, while he disagrees with Oppenheimer’s response, he is “not sure whether 
[he] shall answer,”266 as he “hates polemics.”267 Still, despite this hesitation, he is anxious that 
“once again we may miss the boat” in stopping fascism, even though he has “no personal ax to 
grind” on the topic.268 Loewenstein apparently pressed the same issue while part of the Military 
Government, but unsurprisingly found that nothing he said “would dissuade Oppenheimer, or 
anybody... of their God-like attitudes.”269 Loewenstein again ends the letter on a pessimistic note, 
citing a letter from Germany he received that morning which included the phrase “the crucial 
problem is not to denazify Germany, but to prevent M. G. officers from becoming nazified,” 
which he feels is a “neat summing up of the situation.”270 
 Herz replied to Loewenstein on January 26, 1947. Herz feels strongly that “something 
must be done to correct the wrong impression made in the public271 mind by such statements as 
Mr. Oppenheimer’s.”272 As to the frustration encountered by Loewenstein while he worked at the 
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Military Government, Herz, in his position with the State Department stateside, has found that 
“collaboration with the operating people has been quite satisfactory,” although it is still 
frustrating “to know, or not to know, what eventually happens to one’s suggestions. Final 
decisions, on the part of people ‘with the God-like attitudes’ seem often to be made without the 
required background knowledge of factual conditions – to put it mildly.”273 
 This exchange of letters, more so than any earlier dialogue, shows the similarity in 
worldview between Herz and Loewenstein, and in particular the pessimism shared among the 
scholars. Herz, like Loewenstein, is disgusted with the track denazification is taking, and also 
feels the frustration of working within a government body with no real authority. As he bluntly 
describes, in his opinion frequently those who make the decisions on important – and clearly 
denazification is such an issue, considering the stakes – lack the requisite background knowledge 
to make an informed final choice. Loewenstein’s letter is particularly telling, and reveals the 
extent to which he was still, by 1947, preoccupied with defeating fascism. Underlying his 
critique of the denazification is a persistent fear that, without a more effective and thorough 
process, fascism will reemerge in Germany and once again threaten the west. As Loewenstein 
points out, in perhaps his most controversial comment to date, his fear by this point is not that 
Americans will become overzealous in their prosecution of Nazis; rather, he fears that the 
American soldiers will become nazified themselves. While Herz does not specifically express 
agreement with this sentiment, it is apparent through the content of his response, as well as his 
overall commiserating tone, that he at least in part shares Loewenstein’s concern. By this point, 
Herz shares in Loewenstein’s pessimism and anxiety about fascist, and as a result harbors little 
hope for an effective denazification process. 
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** 
 
 Herz elaborated on his critique of denazification in an article published in the December 
1948 issue of Political Science Quarterly. In “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany,” Herz 
explains in detail the timeline of denazification, the gradual process by which the American 
commitment to denazification has been subverted both purposefully and through laxity, and 
argues that, at the time of publication, Germany was still rife with Nazis, and that these Nazis 
still occupied prominent political and economic positions. To Herz, it is clear that 
“denazification, which began with a bang, has since died with a whimper,” and that the process 
has “opened the way toward renewed control of German public, social, economic and cultural 
life by forces which only partially and temporarily had been deprived of the influence they 
exerted under the Nazi regime.”274 
 Herz begins by reviewing the six stages of denazification, which lasted from 1945 until 
1948, when the programs were shut down. In the first stage, beginning immediately after the 
German surrender, denazification was implemented directly by the American Military 
Government. Within this stage, particularly dangerous Nazis were arrested and placed in 
internment camps, while other categories of Nazis, as well as those Nazis prominent in the 
society, were dismissed from their positions.275 While the standards employed by the Military 
Government were “over-mechanical,” by and large “the program, on the whole, resulted in a 
fairly comprehensive purge of the administration and other fields.”276 
                                                
274  John H. Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany,” Political Science Quarterly 63 (1948): 569. As 
discussed earlier, Herz and Loewenstein were not the only critics of denazification.  
 
275  Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany,” 570-571.  
 
276  Herz, “The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany,” 571. 
 
 94 
 
 The second stage began in 1946, when the Military Government, facing criticism that 
their system was unduly punishing nominal Nazis, transferred the administration of 
denazification to German authorities.277 These authorities operated under the Law for Liberation 
from National Socialism and Militarism, issued on March 5, 1946, which provided “very flexible 
and, on the whole, fair standards and categories.”278 Under this law denazification was 
transferred to local boards and appeal tribunals, and, while initially this move was viewed 
favorably, as “the proceedings took place in local communities, the hearings and trials were 
frequently characterized by intimidation or even terrorism on the part of Nazis and Nazi 
sympathizers.”279The effect of this terrorism was that only a small number of those tried by the 
boards were classified as Major Offenders or Offenders, with most Nazis instead being classified 
as Followers and allowed to return to their positions. In particular, a Military Government review 
of the boards at the end of 1946 found that “less than 20 per cent of the persons MG had 
previously found “non-employable” as majors Nazis had been placed in categories with 
employment prohibitions, while the remainder had been classified as “Followers” or had been 
exonerated.”280 
 The third stage, beginning in August 1946, involved the passage of amnesty laws that 
precluded large portions of the German population from being tried by the denazification boards. 
While Herz approves of the intent behind these laws – to exempt obvious Followers from a 
timely prosecutorial process – “flexible investigation of individual cases” led to “many a 
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prominent Nazi” escaping prosecution.281 Despite these issues, the amnesties, by reducing the 
caseloads of denazification boards, presented an opportunity for more careful examination of 
those suspected Nazis remaining. 
 Unfortunately, this opportunity was never taken advantage of, as in the fourth stage of 
denzaification the Military Government agreed to amend the Liberation Law, allowing a 
prosecutor, with consent of the Military Government, to reclassify any Offender as a Follower.282 
The effect of this change was to allow “the majority of the remaining ‘hard core’ Nazis” to go 
free, and, to Herz, was part of the “ever growing tendency to terminate denazification by 
wholesale extenuation.”283 
` This tendency was even more apparent in the fifth stage, where, beginning in January 
1948, Military Government approval for relabeling Offenders as Followers was no longer 
required. German authorities also introduced an “expediting procedure,” known as B-Verfahren, 
which allowed Followers to be processed in a written procedure.284 By April 1948 over 75% of 
all cases tried by the denazification boards were completed through this process, and in February 
1948 a Military Government directive “provided for the release from internment camps” of large 
groups of remaining Major Offenders, allowing those “who expected severe punishment” to go 
underground.285  
 The sixth and final stage of denazification began in the summer of 1948, during which 
the denazification program was shut down. Working to fulfill a deadline that “denazification was 
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to be concluded by the summer of 1948,” the denazification boards were “instructed to cut down 
on the number of regular trials still to be held.”286 The overall result was that, by June 1948, 
denazification was “terminated under such conditions that premium was given to the ‘hard core’ 
of major Nazis who had managed to delay their trials in hope of forthcoming relaxations,” and 
“most of them now would get away without penalties.”287 These released Major Offenders were 
allowed to rejoin German society, along with tens of thousands of other Nazis, and resume their 
positions. 
 As proof of his argument, Herz provides examples of denazification cases, drawn from 
Military Government reports and German newspaper articles, that illustrate the specific ways in 
which the denazification process was subverted, corrupted, or was simply applied in a cursory 
and insufficient way. While these examples are too numerous and detailed to be reviewed here, 
in particular he highlights cases that evidence leniency shown to “former Nazi propagandists and 
ideologists,” “members of the Nazi terror machine (Gestapo, special courts, etc.),” and “public 
officials and party officials.”288 Herz also reviews the various means by which Nazis were able to 
circumvent or corrupt the denazification boards. Numerous Nazis were able to receive additional 
leniency through ridiculous and illogical explanations for their conduct, including joining the 
Nazi party “not for idealistic but for egoistic reasons,” or acting “not out of conviction but out of 
revenge feeling” when the evidence clearly proved otherwise.289 Herz also finds a significant 
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number of cases that show a “laxity in procedures and in enforcement,” as well as those 
evidencing “pressure, intimidation, and terrorism in denazification procedures.”290 
 The end result of this thorough and detailed case review is a clear argument for the failure 
of denazification. To Herz, denazification “even where handled under comprehensive regulations 
and procedures… has been a complete fiasco.”291 In the aftermath of this failure, “German public 
life… is in the process of being “renazified,” with the “denazified” former Nazis able and very 
willing to enter, or re-enter, public service, economic positions, cultural activities and so on.”292 
The consequence of their reentering is that the American policy of democratizing Germany has 
“simply delivered the fragile new democracy to the tender mercies of its enemies.”293 Faced with 
this development, Herz fears that “Neo-Nazism may yet justify the hope of the dying Nazi 
leaders that one day Germany will come out on top after all.”294 
 Throughout “Fiasco,” Herz’s pessimism and anxiety about fascism is obvious. Like 
Loewenstein, by 1949 he feared that, as a consequence of the American failure to denazify 
Germany – either out of incompetence or unwillingness – there is a chance that Nazism will 
remerge and again threaten the western democracies. This fear further demonstrates the 
similarity in worldview between Loewenstein and Herz: both, despite the utter defeat of Hitler 
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and the stirrings of a new, democratic Germany (at least in the American, British and French 
zones) believe that fascism will again seize control of the German government.295  
 Herz followed up on “Fiasco” with a short letter to the editors of The New York Times, 
published on May 25, 1949, addressing concerns about how effectively German officials were 
screened during denazification. Responding to an article written by the Berlin correspondent, 
which claimed that no Nazis who are barred from positions based on their classification currently 
held public posts, Herz argues that Germans hold a “cynical attitude towards denazification,” and 
that, based on his research, classification is a poor indicator of how much participation an 
individual had with the Nazi regime.296 After briefly summarizing his conclusions as presented in 
“Fiasco” – namely that the German-run denazification boards pursued denazification with an eye 
towards doing whatever they could to move past the Nazi era and not punishing those guilty – 
Herz concludes with a chilling sentiment.297 In his eyes, “we should not allow ourselves to be 
deceived into assuming that denazification has been a success,” as “we would be in for sorry 
surprises later.”298 
 In writing this letter, Herz is showing again that he believes in the importance of 
academics addressing the public in hopes of warning them about the reality of post-war Germany 
and the failure of denazification. Just like Loewenstein in 1946 and 1947 (and in the same 
venue), Herz is doing his part to make the average citizen aware of the threat posed by a 
continuity of public officials between Hitler’s Germany and the new, purportedly democratic 
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state. While Herz never specifically explains this threat within his letter, when read with 
knowledge of his earlier works, it is clear that he is once again speaking of the possibility of a 
renewed fascist Germany threatening America.   
** 
 
 This pessimism can be further seen in Herz’s most well-known work, Political Realism 
and Political Idealism, published in 1951, although almost entirely written during his time at 
Princeton prior to World War II.299 While Herz scholars have analyzed Political Realism and 
Political Idealism at length, as of yet no work within the historiography has examined Herz’s 
book in terms of its pessimism, or used it as part of a comparative analyses with another émigré 
intellectual in the context of a shared worldview.300 In this work, Herz discusses his 
“understanding of the fundamental301… realities of international politics.”302 In this discussion, 
Herz presents a starkly different solution to the dilemma of international politics and the battle 
between competing political ideologies than Loewenstein, foregoing militant democracy in favor 
of a measured international system that combines realism and idealism. This system was 
predicated on simultaneously acknowledging the divisive fundamental nature of mankind 
(rendered by Herz as the security dilemma) and an idealistic hope that man, armed with this 
knowledge, could create a peaceful international system that would obviate this anthropological 
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truth.303 Herz’s pessimism can be seen both in the content of his analysis, which sees man as an 
inherently violent being, as well as the greater context which this analysis is presented. Yet, 
despite his pessimism, and despite his experiences with autocracies, in his theory Herz does not 
prescribe a particular political system, believing that, varying forms of government, regardless of 
their differences or ideologies, can coexist as long as they employ Herz’s combination of realism 
and idealism. This in turn demonstrates the uniqueness of militant democracy, and the 
radicalness of Loewenstein’s fight against fascism, especially during the end of the 1930s and 
World War II.  
Herz’s argument is predicated on his understanding of man’s nature, the “sociopolitical 
constellation Herz identified as the starting point of all theoretical inquiry.”304 As he explains in 
his first chapter – now a “classic in the literature of IR [international relations]” – human beings 
are fundamentally concerned with the security dilemma, or the understanding that man is able to 
inflict violence and death on one another.305 As Herz describes it, 
 [it is] decisive for [man’s] social and political attitudes and ideas [that] other human beings are  
 able to inflict death upon him. The very realization that his own brother may play the role of  
 Cain makes his fellow men appear to him as potential foes. Realization of this fact by others, in  
 turn, makes him appear to them as their potential mortal enemy. Thus arises a fundamental 
 social constellation, a mutual suspicion and a mutual dilemma: the dilemma of “kill or perish.” of 
 attacking first or running the risk of being destroyed. There is apparently no escape from this  
 vicious circle. Whether man is “by nature” peaceful and co-operative, or aggressive and  
 domineering, is not the question. The condition that concerns us here is not an anthropological or 
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 biological [sic], and makes the “homo homini lupus”306 a primary fact of the social life of  
man.”307 
 
Therefore, man, despite his best intentions, must always be suspicious of his neighbor – 
cognizant that, at any moment, violence could arise. The security dilemma forces men into a 
paradoxical situation. On one hand, “feeling himself exposed to dangers which threaten his very 
life, man begins to be concerned about finding some security against this menace.”308 This leads 
man to realize that, on the other hand, “even if he wanted to, he cannot destroy all those who 
might become a menace to his existence,” and that he depends on other men “in producing and 
obtaining the necessities of life.”309 These two realizations create a dilemma in which man must 
both rely and be suspicious of his neighbor, resulting in “competition for the means of 
security.”310 This competition takes the form of a struggle to acquire power, namely the 
accumulation of goods (food, clothing, or weapons) or control over those who produce goods.  
 In this struggle for power Herz sees the roots of politics, and the competition between 
political groups, or “political units.” These units, as well as the manifestation of these units – 
states - can be seen as the security dilemma writ large on a national and international stage.311 As 
Herz summarizes, 
 politically active groups and individuals are concerned about their security from being attacked,  
 subjected, dominated, or annihilated by other groups and individuals. Because they strive to attain 
 security from such attack, and yet can never feel entirely secure in a world of competing units, 
 they are driven toward acquiring more and more power for themselves, in order to escape the 
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 impact of the superior power of others.312 
 
Thus, “to ensure survival, competing political units, whether they like it or not, have to play the 
power game.”313 Appealing to a “higher authority for their protection and survival” is useless, 
and the only way for a nation to ensure its security is by competing with its neighbors. This, in 
turn, ignites a “vicious circle of suspicion and counter-suspicion, power competition, arms races, 
and ultimately war.”314 
 Herz believes that historically man has pursued either realism or idealism in an effort to 
obviate this conflict and overcome the truth that “man is born into a world of fundamental 
antagonism.”315 No matter how complex or protracted a theory is, through careful examination it 
can be reduced to one of these two “ideal types.”316 To Herz, realism “characterizes that type of 
thought which in one form or another, sometimes not fully and other times in an exaggerated 
manner, recognizes and takes into consideration the implications for political life of those 
security and power factors which... are inherent in human society.”317 In contrast, idealism is 
“that type of political thinking which in the main does not318 recognize the problems arising from 
the security and power dilemma.”319 Unfortunately, neither of these approaches is able to 
overcome the security dilemma and break man free of a perpetual cycle of war and conflict.  
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 Yet, in these failures, Herz sees the key to a peaceful world, believing that by pursuing 
Liberal Realism, a combination of both realism and idealism, man can finally overcome the 
security dilemma and progress towards a more peaceful world. In the context of nations, Liberal 
Realism is “equidistant from hard-core realism and utopian idealism” and involves “seeking 
ways of equilibrium in foreign policy without lapsing into utopian thinking.”320 In short, while 
man should be aware his confrontational and aggressive nature, he should, armed with this 
knowledge, work towards creating a peaceful system in which aggression is unnecessary. Herz’s 
thinking here is clearly an attempt to wed the progressive values of traditional liberalism with an 
understanding of man’s violent, irrational character – a character that Herz observed first-hand 
during his forced immigration from Germany.   
 Herz recognizes that this proposed solution is unlikely to occur, acknowledging, “in the 
present stage of history, major trends seem hostile to such an endeavor, even beyond the more 
general realist power factors which have traditionally hampered the liberal ideal.”321 Still, despite 
the unlikelihood of this envisioned future coming to pass, Herz’s system still contains the 
possibility of a peaceful world order.322 Importantly, in describing this peaceful world, Herz 
never argues in favor of a particular political ideology or form of government. For him, unlike 
Loewenstein, the makeup of a government is apparently irrelevant.323 All that is necessary to 
achieve peace is the choice by all nations within this system to pursue Liberal Realism, 
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regardless of their political organization. Thus, within Herz’s system, democracies and 
autocracies could conceivably coexist. 
This understanding is clearly a consequence of the particular context in which Political 
Idealism and Realism was written and published. While much of the work was written during 
Herz’s time at Princeton, before World War II, the concluding chapter and the introduction were 
added during the opening years of the Cold War, amid the growing realization the world had 
been dived into “basically only two power groups,” democracy and communism.324 To Herz, this 
process, as well as the development of atomic energy and the threat posed by the atomic bomb, 
makes the pursuit of Liberal Realism essential for the continuation of mankind. If man destroys 
himself, “the atomic bomb... will then have made history the story of a race which could not 
solve its basic problem of power and security; the sad yet moving saga of hope and failure.”325  
 At first glance, Political Realism and Political Idealism, and in particular Herz’s views 
on the nature of man are thoroughly pessimistic. Further, beyond the specific content of this 
theory, the way in which he introduces the work is instructive of his continuing pessimism. In the 
introduction to Political Realism and Political Idealism Herz describes the world order as “less 
harmonious” than in most of human history.326 Unable to accept eventual, impending doom, to 
man not “even the harmony of a pessimistic world-outlook seems to be granted.”327 Instead, 
 we are simply confused in our views as to what has been, is, and will or should be. A general 
 malaise is becoming increasingly evident, more so perhaps in the unformulated and unspoken 
 sentiments and reactions of the multitude than in the statements and the treatises of the  
 erudite.328 
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Herz even goes so far as to directly acknowledge his pessimism, writing, as part of an analysis of 
the way in which Realist Liberalism could be incorporated into the existing world order, “there is 
real cause for pessimism. We do not belong to those who feel duty-bound to end ‘on a hopeful 
note.’”329 
Yet, despite this apparent and deep held pessimism, and promise to avoid unnecessary 
positivity notwithstanding, Herz’s theory ends with a vision of a future, that, while not utopian, 
is free of violence and war, hinging on the fundamental understanding that “man can act,” and, 
by doing so, better his state of affairs.330 With this understanding, Political Realism and Political 
Idealism and Realist Liberalism can be seen as an academic working out of Herz’s pessimism. 
By the end, Herz has moved past his fundamentally pessimistic anthropology, arguing that man, 
and therefore nations, can overcome the security dilemma.  
** 
 
Comparatively, Loewenstein’s understanding of human nature, as conceived through 
militant democracy, is in line with Herz’s description of the security dilemma. Within Herz’s 
model, the idea that democracies must take steps to temporarily deprive fascists of fundamental 
rights in an effort to protect democratic institutions can be seen as an act by a political unit 
attempting to deprive a potentially hostile opponent of power, as part of an effort to feel more 
secure. However, beyond this initial understanding, the two theories diverge. While 
Loewenstein’s pessimism led him by 1944 and in the aftermath of the war to conceive of militant 
democracy as a permanent solution, even going so far as to argue that fascist states and 
democratic states could not coexist, thereby advocating for the proactive destruction of fascism 
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by democracies, Herz believes that through the creation of an international system peace could 
be achieved. If nations, irrespective of their political ideologies, are willing to follow the path of 
Liberal Realism, then a peaceful world order can be created and maintained. While Herz 
acknowledges that this theorized future is unlikely to come to pass, and is at least in part wildly 
idealistic, at least in his understanding of international relations and politics there exists a 
possibility for a future free of violence in which man has escaped the constraints of this 
anthropology. Contrastingly, in Loewenstein’s militant democracy, there is not.  
In the end, Herz was able to overcome his pessimism, while Loewenstein was never able 
to escape his anxiety about fascism. This difference underscores the unique quality of 
Loewenstein’s militant democracy, as well as its theoretical and practical complexity, features 
lacking from the descriptions of militant democracy presented by scholars referencing 
Loewenstein’s theory. Despite their shared biographies and similar worldviews, Loewenstein and 
Herz arrived at dramatically different solutions for the dilemmas facing modern democracies.  
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Conclusion: 
 
The Lasting Influence of Militant Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 On May 8, 1949 the new German constitution, the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany, was approved, and, following review by the Allied Military government (which at that 
time still occupied Germany), came into effect on May 23, 1949.331 Included in this new 
constitution, with an eye the failures of Weimar and the emergence of the Nazi Party, Germany’s 
constitutional court, the Bundesverfassungsgericht, has the ability to label political parties as 
unconstitutional.332 Detailed in Article 21, section 2,  
 parties that, by reason of their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to undermine or  
 abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence of the Federal Republic of  
 Germany shall be unconstitutional. The Federal Constitutional Court shall rule on the question of 
 unconstitutionality.333  
 
The Federal Constitutional Court also has the ability restrict the fundamental rights of citizens if 
those citizens abuse these rights as part of an effort to undermine democracy, as outlined in 
Article 18, which states that 
 whoever abuses the freedom of expression, in particular the freedom of the press (paragraph (1)  
 of Article 5), the freedom of teaching (paragraph (3) of Article 5), the freedom of assembly  
 (Article 8), the freedom of association (Article 9), the privacy of correspondence, posts and  
 telecommunications (Article 10), the rights of property (Article 14), or the right of asylum  
 (Article 16a) in order to combat the free democratic basic order shall forfeit these rights. This 
 forfeiture and its extent shall be declared by the Federal Constitutional Court.334 
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These two provisions, which act to limit the ability of fascists, communists, or other extremists to 
abuse democratic rights in order to destroy the democratic system, are clearly examples of 
militant democracy in action, and represent the first time such provisions have been included in 
the constitution of a modern state.  
 Today, following the example of Germany in the Basic Law, numerous countries have 
either amended their constitutions to include provisions which can be characterized as militant 
democracy, or have passed legislation which seeks to temporarily deprive the fundamental rights 
of those that are attempting to overthrow the democratic order.335 Among others, these countries 
include Australia, Russia, Turkey and Spain, and today, amid new concerns about domestic 
terrorism activity, and in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States, even 
more nations are looking towards militant democracy as a possible solution for Muslim 
extremism as part of the War on Terror.336 While this global legislative and constitutional 
movement cannot be attributed solely to Loewenstein (similar legislation existed before he ever 
wrote on the subject), such laws can be seen as examples of the importance of his thinking, as 
well as the enduring legacy of militant democracy as a political idea. While the practical 
examples of militant democracy today fall chronologically into the earlier part of Loewenstein’s 
work – as of yet no nation has taken militant democracy to the logical conclusion that he did by 
1944, believing that it is impossible for autocratic and democratic states to coexist – the ideas 
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discussed by Loewenstein clearly have had a lasting influence of the way in which democracies 
respond to potential enemies.337  
 Yet, despite these positive developments, as well as the fact that fascist Germany did not 
reemerge to threaten the west, Loewenstein remained pessimistic for the remainder of his life. 
Writing to Herz on October 13, 1960, Loewenstein is sharply critical of West Germany, 
expressing sympathy with the Soviet controlled East, as the “youth in Eastern Germany derives 
considerable satisfaction on building up a new country, and [this] achievement is considerable 
enough to compensate for the loss of certain western freedoms.”338 While Loewenstein’s affinity 
with a system that deprives citizens of their fundamental rights is not particularly surprising, it is 
notable that Loewenstein compliments this system while criticizing West Germany, which by 
1960 was a fully functioning, independent democratic state with a constitution that contained 
many of Loewenstein’s theoretical ideas.  
Writing again to Herz again on February 5, 1972, only a year before his death, 
Loewenstein is still clearly pessimistic. Responding to a number of articles (which are not 
named) that Herz had sent him, Loewenstein is highly critical of “the producers of the 
behaviorist nonsense,” and believes that  
I think we [Loewenstein and Herz] should borrow from them a piece of their thunder and add that 
many of them, if not the majority, are Jewish, which does not seem to me purely accidental. I take 
some names at random; The Almond, Aptel, de Sola Pool, Deutsch, Easton, Eulau and so on. I  
have the hunch that plethora of Jews among the new scientists is a flashback to their former  
Talmudic training. Most of what they do, the subtle distinctions, the use of mathematical or  
psuedo-mathematical formulae, the graphs etc require a specific turn of mind that seems to me  
altogether Talmudic. The attraction of the game lies also in the incapability of being checked or  
controlled by objective standards. Nobody ever tests the formulae in practice. Of course this 
cannot be said in public because “science” is “objective” and beyond bigoted bias. Nonetheless, 
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it is worth considering.339 
 
Although discussing the development of behaviorism and not militant democracy or fascism, 
Loewenstein’s bitterness is readily apparent. Further, just as he did during his public campaign 
for militant democracy in the years before World War II, Loewenstein is taking care to separate 
himself from other Jews, going so far as to characterize Jewish thinking as coming from a 
particular Talmudic state of mind that obviously, by implication, he does not share. Clearly the 
pessimistic worldview that found expression in Loewenstein’s anxiety about fascism and 
campaign for militant democracy is still, at this late date, in existence.  
 On his part, Herz remained optimistic. In 1981 he published a follow up to Political 
Realism and Political Realism, “Political Realism Revisited” in International Studies Quarterly. 
Here, Herz reaffirms much of his original writing, arguing again that man is driven by the 
security dilemma, and that historically political systems can be defined as either realistic or 
idealistic. He still believes that through a combination of these two systems, which he originally 
described as Liberal Realism (a term that he does not use in this article), a peaceful international 
system can be achieved. During the thirty years since his original work was published, Herz has 
come to believe that two additional areas of inquiry are important as part of the effort to 
understand international relations: the development of a more “sophisticated” understanding of 
realism “that distinguishes ‘real’ facts and situations from the views of actors and publics have 
formed about them,” and an inquiry into the idea of purpose, the “ought to of politics... not in the 
utopian fashion of a moralist approach but in the sense of finding out what are attainable 
objectives in international politics.”340 
                                                
339  Loewenstein to Herz, February 5, 1972. John H. Herz Papers. Box 3, Folder 73. 
 
340  John H. Herz, “Political Realism Revisited,” International Studies Quarterly 25 (1981): 183-184. 
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 As part of a more nuanced understanding of realism, Herz is interested in the role played 
by “image and image-making, of status and ranking, of diplomatic symbolism, of recognition 
and nonrecognition” in international relations.341 While he does not undertake this investigation 
within this article (in fact “Political Realism Revisited” reads as more of a project proposal than 
an argument driven essay), he believes that research along these lines is important and necessary. 
In regards to purpose, to Herz the overriding concern behind international politics, in a “nuclear 
age, where all have become penetrable,” must be world peace, and “purpose, therefore, in a 
nuclear age, must be defined in a way that recognizes world peace as the overriding interest of 
all.”342 Herz’s understanding here is, in effect, a doubling down of his belief in the possibility for 
a world free of international conflict, a confirmation of the optimism seen originally in Political 
Realism and Idealism. Even after the American failure in Vietnam and three decades of nuclear 
standoff, he still imagines a future in which international politics can act as a means for mankind, 
despite ideological and political differences, to create a world system that provides security and 
obviates the security dilemma. Unlike Loewenstein, Herz was able to move past his pessimism.  
 This pessimism is essential to Loewenstein, and helps explain and reveal the distinctive 
evolution of militant democracy from 1935 until 1946. Beginning with Loewenstein’s 
“Autocracy Versus Democracy,” and ending with his critique of denazification following his exit 
from government service, militant democracy transformed from temporary restrictions on 
fascists to protect democracy into a full-fledged transformation of the democratic system, 
underscored by the belief that democracies and autocracies could never coexist. This evolution, 
and the documents that reveal it, are essential to understanding militant democracy. While 
Loewenstein’s more extreme thinking never found its way into any modern constitutions or 
                                                
341  Herz, “Political Realism Revisited,” 187. 
 
342  Herz, “Political Realism Revisited,” 188, 191.  
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legislation, it still represents an example of how an émigré intellectual responded to the conflict 
between democracy and fascism in the aftermath of his forced immigration from Germany due to 
his ethnic heritage. Ignoring this story is a misunderstanding of Loewenstein and his work, as 
well as his place within the greater émigré movement.  
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